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 Exactly what happened to 43 university students who were kidnapped by local police in 
Iguala, Mexico may never be known. On the night of September 26, 2014, police attacked five 
intercity buses that had been commandeered by students from the Raúl Isidro Burgos Rural 
Teachers College in nearby Ayotzinapa, in the southern Mexican state of Guerrero. Although the 
temporary seizure of buses for transportation to political rallies (the Ayotzinapa students planned 
to travel to Mexico City for the anniversary of the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre a few days later) 
had long been tolerated by authorities, that night police from Iguala and several neighboring 
towns launched a planned, coordinated assault on the unarmed students. They opened fire on 
some of the buses, killing a number of students on the scene; with the other buses, the police 
rounded up those they could catch, loaded them on to trucks and vans and disappeared into the 
night. Forty-three of the students were never seen again.1 
  
 Despite multiple investigations by Mexican authorities, multilateral organizations, 
independent groups, and journalists, there is no definitive explanation for the kidnappings and 
apparent murders. The remains of none but two of the 43 students have been located. The motive 
for the police assault, and – according to various accounts – later transfer of the kidnapped 
students to local narcotics traffickers, the federal police or the army, has never been clearly 
established. Even against the backdrop of incredible violence that has characterized the brutal 
reign of Mexico’s drug cartels and widespread official corruption, a motivation for abducting and 
 
1 Archibold, Randal C. “43 Missing Students, a Mass Grave and a Suspect: Mexico’s Police.” 






killing so many young people in plain sight, then hiding their bodies, remains confounding. 
There are many theories, including that the students had somehow angered Iguala’s mayor, or 
that the students had inadvertently intercepted a planned shipment of heroin or cash in one or 
more of the buses they took, but the brutality of the events that night in Iguala still makes little 
sense.2 To a society long accustomed to senseless violence, this was a shocking crime.   
 
  
What has become clear is that the response by Mexico’s society, its government, and the 
international community to those crimes marks a significant departure from other such human 
rights violations in that country’s long struggle with narcotics trafficking, corruption, and 
violence. The sequence of events that night, the motives of the perpetrators, even the 
identification of those responsible and the location of the victims – however meaningful for 
accountability and closure – are arguably less important than the reaction of the Mexican people 
and the wider world.  The murder of so many young people at the hands of the authorities, even 
in the country’s most violent crime-plagued state, provoked a wave a popular outrage and 
activism.3 The fierce, sustained response shook the political establishment and began a new era 




2 Goldman, Francisco. “Mexico’s Missing Forty-Three: One Year, Many Lies, and a Theory 
That Might Make Sense.” The New Yorker, September 30, 2015.  
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/mexicos-missing-forty-three-one-year-many-lies-
and-a-theory-that-might-make-sense 
3 Goldman, Francisco. “Crisis in Mexico: The Protests for the Missing Forty-Three.” The New 






This paper is about the human rights response to Ayotzinapa, not determining what 
happened, or even why, although it discusses those issues. This is a review and an analysis of 
how families, civil society, human rights defenders, and the international community refused to 
accept yet another atrocity, and began a sustained campaign for justice and accountability.  It 
addresses the challenges facing them, the effectiveness of their efforts, and the lessons their 
experiences can provide toward advancing the promotion and protection of human rights more 
broadly.  The response to these crimes marks a turning point in Mexico’s human rights 
advocacy, the beginning of greater engagement by the country in confronting abuses and greater 
political accountability, although with future progress still in doubt. 
 
  
Led at first by the families of the victims and quickly joined by the broader public and 
civil society, demonstrations for justice in the case began almost immediately after the 
disappearances, drawing thousands to protest in the streets in Guerrero, the national capital, 
Mexico City, and throughout the country. The intensity of the reaction took Mexican authorities 
by surprise. They quickly put together an official version of events, later discredited and 
withdrawn, and announced the arrest of 22 police officers two days after the abductions. The 
mayor of Iguala and his wife went on the run, Guerrero’s governor resigned, the federal attorney 
general and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto were put back on the defensive as protests 
continued. The public remained unconvinced by their implausible explanations, and the case 
attracted the attention of the international news media, foreign governments and international 
human rights organizations.4   Reluctantly, the Mexican government agreed to accept 
 






investigations by independent, international experts, including from the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations, which reported ongoing efforts to cover 
up or otherwise hinder investigations.5 
 
 
 With mounting evidence of high-level Mexican government complicity and obstruction, 
the advocacy efforts of the families and their allies among human rights defenders and journalists 
persisted and kept the case in the spotlight despite little progress toward determining the fate of 
the missing. Family members, most of them rural people with basic education, became effective 
lobbyists for their cause in Mexico City and the wider world, embarking on a tour of the United 
States to raise awareness, including to Washington and UN headquarters in New York.6 The 
election of the populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador as president in December 2018 gained the 
Ayotzinapa activists a powerful ally in government, who pledged to investigate the case fully 
and use the full power of the state to put an end to impunity in the case. Two days after being 
sworn into office, López Obrador issued a decree establishing an investigatory Truth and Justice 
Commission, including as members some parents of the victims and their representatives.7 A 
new special prosecutor has been named, and the new government’s investigation has yielded 
additional arrests and identification of at least one more of the missing victims’ remains.  Still, 
 
5 Organization of American States. “CIDH oficializa acuerdo de cooperación técnica sobre 
estudiantes de Ayotzinapa, México.” Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, November 
18, 2014.  http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2014/136.asp 
6 Lovato, Roberto.  “How the ‘Desaparecidos’ of Ayotzinapa Have Sparked a U.S.-Mexican 
Solidarity Movement.” The Nation, April 21, 2015. 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-desaparecidos-ayotzinapa-have-sparked-us-
mexican-solidarity-movement/ 
7 Díaz, Gloria and Arturo Rodríguez.  “López Obrador formaliza comisión para la verdad y 







even as the families’ fight receives greater recognition and support, progress in getting answers 
and justice for the victims remains slow. 
 
  
This paper draws on a wide range of published information about the Ayotzinapa case, 
including contemporary news accounts, testimonies, journalistic investigations, and reports by 
human rights organizations, Mexican authorities, international commissions, and multilateral 
organizations on human rights.  It has been supplemented by interviews with human rights 
activists, journalists, and academics, both in Mexico and the United States, focusing on the 
significance of the Ayotzinapa case for Mexican society and the promotion of human rights more 
generally. 
  
Chapter 1 serves to introduce the events of the case and immediate response from the 
perspective of several individuals representing various participants, including one of the victims 
(based on public information about his life), a family member, a Mexican government official, 
and a member of civil society.  Chapter 2 provides historical context of recent Mexican history, 
highlighting corruption, violence, flawed institutions, and the role of civil society.  Chapter 3 
reviews the known and disputed facts of the case, including a chronology, as well as differing 
accounts and theories about what happened and why.  Chapter 4 examines the local and national 
authorities’ public and actual response to the crimes, including cover-up and shifting accounts, 
which adapt to family, media, NGO and international reactions.  Chapter 5 looks at how the 
families and other advocates for accountability and justice brought sustained pressure, raising the 
case to national and international prominence despite government efforts, and countering the 





impact of the human rights response in the Ayotzinapa case, including observations from 



























Chapter 1: Perspectives on Ayotzinapa 
 
As he climbed aboard the bus with the words “Estrella de Oro” emblazoned on the side, 
Benjamín Bautista could not have imagined that he and his classmates would almost certainly be 
dead within hours, nor that his student group would soon become internationally-known human 
rights victims – and perhaps alter the course of Mexican history. Benjamín had arrived in the 
town of Iguala, in the southern Mexican state of Guerrero earlier that day. He was nineteen years 
old, studying to be a teacher at the Raúl Isidro Burgos Teachers College in Ayotzinapa, some 90 
miles away. For Benjamín and most of his fellow students, the teachers college was one of the 
few ways that a young person could hope to escape from the hard poverty of rural life. Most of 
his friends’ parents were poor farmers and agricultural workers; Benjamín had been raised by his 
single mother in the remote mountains, speaking his native Nahuatl language at home. There, he 
worked in the fields, and helped out his extended family by selling bread his mother baked, while 
always wanting to study and become a teacher. His mother later said that she had at first asked 




The Raúl Isidro Burgos Teachers College was well known in the area for its leftist 
politics and student activism, typical of many Mexican institutions of higher learning. For years, 
it had been the regular practice of the school’s student teachers to take part in protests and public 
events both in Guerrero and in the national capital. On that day Benjamín boarded the bus in 
 
8 Rangel, Yunuhen. “Two Years of Torment, of Searching, of Refusing to Give Up.” 





Iguala, September 26, 2014, he and his comrades were commandeering a number of intercity 
buses to take them in a few days to Mexico City. There, they planned to participate in protests 
commemorating the anniversary of the massacre of students at Tlatelolco on October 2, 1968 – a 
landmark date in the modern movement against authoritarianism in Mexico.9 
 
  
The practice of students taking over buses and forcing their drivers to transport them to 
such events was not unusual, and usually peaceful. The students’ commandeering of buses that 
night in Iguala was delayed briefly to allow for one of the bus drivers to have someone bring him 
a change of clothes and some documents from home. Benjamín may have felt nervous or excited 
about hijacking the buses, but he understood that until then there had been nothing dangerous 
about it.  In most cases, the police and local authorities had looked the other way, tolerating such 
actions as inconveniences but not criminal behavior.  Drivers were usually instructed not to resist 
and stay with the buses to ensure their safe return.10 
 
  
Benjamín could be expected to be concerned about the security situation in his state more 
generally, however, as narcotics traffickers and other organized crime gangs terrorized Mexican 
society with kidnappings, assassinations, extortions, and other violent crimes. Estimates of those 
killed in the ongoing drug wars reached 60-70,000 by the mid-2010s, creating a general climate 
 
9  Hernández, Anabel. A Massacre in Mexico. Verso, 2020, p.7.  






of fear among ordinary citizens even though most victims were directly involved in trafficking.11  
Teachers in Acapulco, on Guerrero’s coast, went on strike in 2011 to protest extortions and 
kidnappings, abuses that continued in subsequent years. Guerrero to this day remains known as 
among the most violent states of Mexico – a fact that Benjamín and his classmates had lived with 
their entire lives. 
 
 
 With at least two buses already under their control, the Ayotzinapa students were able to 
commandeer three more in the center of Iguala and prepared to head out.  Unbeknownst to them, 
however, police forces from Iguala and several nearby cities had been monitoring their 
activities. Without any warning, the police attacked buses in the center of town, opening fire into 
the vehicles and striking the unarmed students inside. Word of the assault quickly reached the 
students in the other buses across town. A number of Benjamín’s fellow students, or normalistas 
(as teachers college students are known), rushed to the scene from Ayotzinapa and elsewhere in 
Iguala to find their wounded classmates gathered on the blood-soaked street, littered with shells 
and broken glass. Soon they had attracted the attention of neighbors, and alerted local teachers 
and media, who converged on the site only to face a second assault by police, who opened fire 
again and killed and wounded more. Meanwhile, the police had seized the other buses and 
rounded up many of the passengers, the survivors (including those fleeing on foot), and put them 
on trucks and vans heading out of town.  Benjamín might have been killed during the assaults; it 
not even known for certain which of the two Estrella de Oro buses he had been on.  But if not, 
 
11 Shirk, David, and Joel Wallman. “Understanding Mexico’s Drug Violence.” Journal of 






he must have known that he and his friends were in mortal danger.  He and 42 other students 
from the Raúl Isidro Burgos Teachers College have not been seen alive since.12 
 
Shortly before 10 p.m. that evening, parents began receiving calls from their children 
under siege or on the run in Iguala.  Word spread quickly despite the confusion, and soon Hilda 
Legideño Vargas became aware that something bad was happening. Hilda had not heard 
anything from her son, Jorge Antonio Tizapa, who had started at Ayotzinapa just two months 
earlier, and who, she knew, had planned to travel to Iguala that day. Like so many of his fellow 
students at the teaching college, Jorge had enrolled as a means of escaping from rural poverty 
and its limited opportunities. He had been working previously as a passenger van driver, putting 
in long hours for little pay, and concluded that the income would not be enough to help his 
family and provide for his young daughter. Hilda explained later that she had been proud to see 
Jorge begin school in Ayotzinapa, as it represented hope for a better life for her son.13   
 
  
Concerned about the news of something happening in Iguala, Hilda went as quickly as 
she could to the school, some 30 minutes away by motorbike. There, she found many other 
alarmed parents gathered, sharing the news they had gotten from their sons and friends. The full 
extent of the crimes was not yet clear. The initial information was that at least one person had 
been killed in a confrontation with police, and that dozens of students had been arrested. Hilda 
 
12 Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI), Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. Ayotzinapa Report: Investigation and Initial Conclusions (I), Summary. 
Organization of American States, 2015.  
http://media.wix.com/ugd/3a9f6f_e1df5a84680a4a8a969bd45453da1e31.pdf 
13 Legideño Vargas, Hilda. “One Year After the Disappearance of 43 Mexican Students, Their 
Mothers are Still Demanding Answers.”  Interview by Amy Goodman.  Democracynow.org., 





and other parents asked for help in getting to Iguala, but there was no way to find out or get to 
the location of the attacks. Instead, they waited for their children to return to the school, as some 
had reported that they were on their way. 14 
 
  
By the next day, Saturday, a number of normalistas who had been in Iguala showed up at 
the school, and shared with their parents what they had seen and experienced. Hilda’s son Jorge 
was not among them, but the students explained that many of their classmates had run off into 
the hills when the buses were attacked, and that others would return. But to Hilda’s growing 
alarm, no more students appeared at the school, and so she and other parents traveled to Iguala 
on that Sunday and Monday (September 28 and 29). There, they heard more detailed accounts of 
the attacks and abductions, but still had no idea what exactly had happened or where to find their 
children. Hilda and others searched in vain for their children in the churches and jails, becoming 
increasingly more frightened and desperate.15 
 
 
 Soon, the news of the police assaults – at least two of which took place in the open streets 
in Iguala’s center, in view of local citizens and other witnesses – spread throughout the region 
and the country. National newspapers reported at least five deaths and 25 wounded, with dozens 
missing. While Hilda was searching frantically for Jorge in Iguala, other parents and student 
leaders held a press conference September 27 at the school in Ayotzinapa. They denounced the 








Flores Velázquez, Iguala mayor José Luis Abarca Velázquez and Guerrero governor Ángel 
Aguirre Rivero. Federal authorities announced their investigation into the Iguala police that same 
day, arresting 22 officers a day later.  Meanwhile, Mayor Abarca denied any knowledge of the 
attacks until after the fact.16 
 
  
Hilda later recalled that those early days and months after her son’s disappearance were 
very difficult.  “There was no peace in our heart,” she said. “We couldn’t stand to be at home, as 
seeing his things would make us sad, and often we couldn’t even eat, but people told us that we 
had to look after ourselves to move forward.”17 Together with the other parents of the missing, 
and aided by activist groups including unions, political action and human rights groups, Hilda 
moved forward by mobilizing in public protests against the Mexican government’s apparent 
complicity and inaction. As protests in Guerrero and Mexico City grew, Hilda was often there, 
and she traveled to the United States and other Latin American countries to help sustain 
international awareness of the crimes, giving testimony on news programs and addressing 
gatherings. Antonio Tizapa, Hilda’s husband and Jorge’s father, took up the protests in New 
York, where he had been working as a plumber in Brooklyn to support the family since Jorge 
was five years old. Antonio organized vigils, hunger strikes and publicity runs on behalf of the 
missing in Ayotzinapa, including protesting in front of the Mexican consulate in New York on 
the 26th day of each month.18 Back in Mexico, Hilda never wavered in her conviction that the 
 
16 Ocampo Arista, Sergio. “Policías balean a normalistas de Ayotzinapa en Iguala.” La Jornada, 
September 28, 2014. https://www.jornada.com.mx/2014/09/28/politica/005n1pol 
17 Legideño Vargas. 
18 Vilchis, Raúl.  “For an Aggrieved Father, the New York City Marathon is More Than a Race.” 






authorities were behind her son’s disappearance and that they were covering up the truth.  When 
the new López Obrador government formed a Truth and Justice Commission to address the 




Jesús Murillo Karam, Mexico’s federal attorney general, assumed official control of the 
Ayotzinapa investigation from Guerrero state authorities October 4, after it had become clear that 
local authorities were incapable of conducting a credible inquiry – or, at least, one that could 
appear credible to the public. The arrest of 22 police officers, the flight of Mayor Abarca and 
identification of the Guerreros Unidos drug syndicate as likely responsible for the ultimate fate 
of the missing students had done little to curb growing popular anger at authorities at all levels. 
President Peña Nieto apparently recognized that the fierce local reaction and widespread scrutiny 
would require a federal response.    
 
  
That response included scores of arrests of local police, public officials, and criminal 
gang members over the following month, allowing Murillo’s team to assemble an official version 
of events but uncover virtually no traces of the missing students. Protests grew steadily over the 
acknowledged collusion among local officials, police and drug gangs and the lack of progress in 
finding the victims. Demonstrators occupied and set fire to state government offices in 
Guerrero’s capital October 13, forcing Governor Aguirre to step down ten days later. General 
 






strikes, marches, and mass demonstrations throughout Mexico but, especially in the capital, 
increased the pressure on Murillo and Peña Nieto.20 The Mexican president pledged to make the 
case a “priority” for his government and met for hours with family members at his official 
residence on October 29.21 
 
  
Following a month of arrests, investigation, and forensic searches, Murillo was ready 
November 7 to hold a press conference to deliver his findings – the official version of events, 
what he would later call the “historical truth” of the case. The attorney general maintained that 
the Ayotzinapa students had been attacked on the orders of Iguala Mayor Arbaca, who was 
concerned that the students would disrupt an event his wife was hosting (both the mayor and his 
wife had been arrested a few days earlier, after weeks on the run).  Those that had been detained 
by the police, Murillo reported, were turned over to Arbaca’s allies among the Guerreros Unidos, 
who believed the normalistas to be members of a rival drug gang, “Los Rojos.” The Guerreros 
Unidos then executed the students, burned their bodies overnight at a nearby dump, and then 
collected the ashes and disposed of them in a stream. To substantiate his claims, Murillo showed 
video footage of Guerreros Unidos members confessing to the actions described. Forensics 
experts had searched through the supposed remains of the murdered students, he said, but could 
find no usable DNA evidence, except for that of one victim.22 
 
 
20 Goldman, Francisco. “Crisis in Mexico: Could Forty-Three Missing Students Spark a 
Revolution?” The New Yorker, October 30, 2014. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/crisis-mexico-forty-three-missing-students-spark-revolution 
21 Maldonado, Tryno. Faces of the Disappeared, Ayotzinapa: A Chronicle of Injustice. Schaffner 
Press, 2018, pp. 23-28. 
22 González Rodríguez, Sergio. The Iguala 43: The Truth and Challenge of Mexico’s 






It was an incredible story, one that raised many questions and would later be effectively 
and thoroughly challenged by multiple experts and independent reviews.  For now, though, it 
was the official story. Earlier in the day, in a hangar at the airport in Chilpancingo, the capital of 
Guerrero, Murillo had briefed the family members of the victims in a forty-minute meeting that 
he characterized afterward as “painful, peaceful, and very respectful.” The family members 
heard Murillo’s findings but spoke out publicly afterwards to reject them and call again on the 
government to find their children.23 At the end of his press conference hours later in Mexico 
City, Murillo cut off further questions by declaring softly, “Ya me cansé” (literally, “I’m tired,” 
or “I’ve had enough”). Within hours, this admission – which many took to signify the 
indifference of the government – was taken up by protesters throughout the country.  That phrase 
spread throughout social media with the tag #Yamecanse, and the words, “Ya me cansé del 




Among those who found the government’s version and handling of the case suspect was 
Mexican human rights lawyer Santiago Aguirre Espinosa. Aguirre, then deputy director of the 
Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center (better known as Centro Prodh) in Mexico 
 
23 Ocampo, Sergio and Rubicela Morelos.  “Padres de los normalistas exigen pruebas 
científicas.” La Jornada, November 8, 2014. 
https://www.jornada.com.mx/2014/11/08/politica/003n1pol 
24 Associated Press. “’I’ve Had Enough’ Says Mexican Attorney General in Missing Students 







City, heard about the attacks in Iguala almost immediately, as a team from his center had been 
investigating an unrelated massacre in Guerrero on that day.25 The scale of the police assault and 
the abduction of so many apparently innocent young civilians were shocking, even to an 
experienced human rights defender such as Aguirre. In the weeks that followed, Aguirre, 
working together with a Guerrero-based human rights group, the Centro de Derechos Humanos 
de la Montaña Tlachinollan, took up the cause of the disappeared students’ families and 
eventually served as their legal counsel.  
  
 Aguirre could appreciate even in those early days how the Ayotzinapa crimes – the 
coordinated action of the state and criminal gangs against everyday people – might unleash a 
wave of protest from Mexican society, forced to endure high levels of violent crime, oppression, 
and official impunity. Speaking on national radio, Aguirre in October characterized the killings 
and disappearances as “the single most serious act of massive human rights violations in the past 
40 years” in the country.26 As mass protests, marches, violent demonstrations, and global appeals 
were increasing in intensity, Aguirre and other human rights defenders were also keeping close 
watch on the Mexican government’s efforts to limit the political fallout and close the case as 
quickly as possible. 
 
 
25 Franco, Marina. “Five Years Ago, 43 Students Vanished. The Mystery, and the Pain, Remain.” 
The New York Times, September 26, 2014. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/world/americas/Ayotzinapa-mexico-students-
anniversary.html 
26 20 Minutos. “Normalista: ‘A Julio C. Mondragón lo desollaron porque escupió a la cara del 







 Aguirre became a vocal critic of the government’s investigation and, later, bungled 
prosecutions, highlighting discrepancies in Murillo’s account that were explored more fully by 
independent experts (beginning with the GIEI, or Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts 
from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 2015-16, with whom Aguirre 
cooperated closely). Confessions by the Guerreros Unidos members had clearly been gained 
through torture, Aguirre and most other observers concluded. The government mishandled 
evidence, closed off access to documentation and potential witnesses, failed to look critically at 
the improbable disposal of the victims’ remains by fire, and did not pursue the murder and 
kidnapping charges against even the supposed perpetrators. Worst of all, from Aguirre’s 
perspective as a representative of the families, the government failed to find the missing students. 
Aguirre and many other members of civil society welcomed the election of President López 
Obrador in 2018 and his pledge to end corruption and impunity (like Hilda Legideño, Aguirre 
was named to serve on the new Truth and Justice Commission). 
 
The attacks, disappearances and murders of the students of the Raúl Isidro Burgos 
Teachers College in Iguala, Mexico that night set in motion an enduring campaign by family 
members to seek answers and accountability, if not the return of their sons.  It prompted the 
Mexican authorities to obstruct efforts to get at the full truth of those crimes. And it encouraged 
Mexican civil society to forge new alliances at home and around the world to demand 
fundamental change, long overdue in a country plagued by violence and corruption. Ayotzinapa 
began with the state’s human rights violations of a hundred or so individuals.  It also forced a 
national response that illustrates the challenges and effectiveness of human rights promotion, and 





Chapter 2: Guerrero’s History of Violence and Impunity 
 
 As shocking as the attacks on the Ayotzinapa students were to Mexican society and the 
wider world, they were nevertheless a product of the region’s violent history, which has long 
been marked by political turmoil, government oppression and corruption, poverty, savage drug 
cartels, and weak public institutions and civil society. These factors by themselves cannot 
explain the crimes, but they provide necessary context to help understand how such horrific 
human rights violations could be committed, and how they came as a breaking point for so many 
long accustomed to abuse, moving citizens and advocates to act. 
 
 For over seventy years, Mexico had been governed by a one-party state, as the ruling 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) maintained its hold on power at every level throughout 
the country despite the pretense of democracy and disputed elections. The PRI dominated 
Mexico’s political and economic life by effectively co-opting much of society through patronage 
and corruption, and, when necessary, using the machinery of the state to commit electoral fraud, 
and security forces to suppress dissent. Its ideology was nominally leftist, in keeping with the 
revolutionary Mexican Constitution of 1917, but, in practice, the PRI’s principal objective was to 
preserve its absolute rule.  Mexico developed into what Mario Vargas Llosa famously 
characterized in 1990 as a “perfect dictatorship...a camouflaged dictatorship,” with all the 
features of a dictatorship, albeit of a party rather than a single leader (Octavio Paz replied that 





distinction without a difference for millions of Mexicans whose rights were denied by the 
governing party).27 
 
 Whether a form of dictatorship or a “hegemonic system of domination,” the PRI ensured 
not only its own survival, but also the suppression of democracy and civil society, attacking 
opposition through extrajudicial violence and fraud whenever pressure tactics and bribery failed. 
By the late 1960s, popular dissatisfaction with social inequality, corruption, and government 
oppression led to large-scale protests against the Mexican government, particularly among 
university student groups. These led to violent conflicts, most infamously in the cases of the 
government’s massacre of protesters on the eve of the 1968 Olympics and then three years later 
in the “Corpus Christi” massacre.28  
  
 In the first incident, known as “Tlatelolco” for the district in Mexico City where it took 
place, government troops and police opened fire on thousands of students, killing hundreds in a 
brutal show of force. Students, labor activists and others had been facing off against police 
throughout that summer in growing protests over social inequality, democracy, and against 
massive public spending to host the Olympic Games in Mexico City.29 Determined that such 
displays would not damage Mexico’s image during the games, President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz 
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directed on October 2, 1968 that the military and police put a bloody end to the demonstrations 
and then ensured that the full story of the action would not get out until well after the Olympics. 
The government’s version of events (e.g., that casualties were a small fraction of the real 
number, that the students had shot first, that the action had not been planned) did not prevail for 
long, however, and Tlateloco soon became an enduring symbol of PRI oppression and of the 
Mexican people’s fight for their rights. It was to attend a commemoration of Tlateloco’s 
anniversary that the Ayotzinapa students had been collecting funds and commandeering 
transportation when they were attacked, kidnapped, and almost certainly murdered.   
 
 Under a new government headed by President Luis Echeverría (elected in 1970, and Díaz 
Ordaz’s former interior minister), the hard line against dissent continued. University students 
hoping to resume the movement cut down in 1968 were infiltrated, harassed, and beaten by 
government-backed youth squads. At the first major student demonstration in Mexico City since 
Tlateloco on June 10, 1971, the combined forces of the PRI-organized paramilitary group Los 
Halcones (“the Falcons”) and the police attacked unarmed protesters, killing dozens and 
wounding hundreds more. Once again, the Mexican government sought to distance itself from its 
crime, which came to be known as the Corpus Christi massacre or “El Halconazo,” but the brutal 
message was clear to all who would openly oppose the PRI. 
 
 The late 1960s saw the emergence of organized, radical opposition to the Mexican 
government, as leftist guerilla groups formed to fight against the PRI-led regime as the university 
students by themselves could not. In Guerrero, these included the ACNR (the National Civic 





(“Party of the Poor,” or PdlP), led by Lucio Cabañas Barrientos. The ACNR’s roots go back a 
decade earlier, to Vázquez’s leadership of peaceful opposition to the corrupt and abusive rule of 
Governor Luis Raúl Caballero, who was finally removed from office by the federal government 
after a massacre of protestors in the state capital of Chilpancingo in December 1960. Although 
the PRI felt compelled to oust Caballero, unfortunately it did not reject his repressive methods – 
rather, it came to rely on them to counter civil protest. The PdlP, meanwhile, was founded in 
reaction to yet another massacre by government forces, of student and leftist protesters in 
Ayotac, Guerrero, in May 1967. Until that point, Cabañas – a teacher and communist activist, 
himself a graduate of the Ayotzinapa teachers college – had fought for social justice by peaceful 
means, but after Ayotac he fled into the Guerrero countryside and organized a formidable 
guerrilla force, working in concert with Vazquez’s ACNR and other armed groups.30  
 
 The actions of Cabañas and other leftist guerilla groups in Guerrero, including armed 
attacks, kidnappings of senior officials for ransom and political advantage, bombings, and 
murders, caused state and federal authorities to escalate their campaign of repression in turn, 
taking the country into what became known as Mexico’s “Dirty War.”  Although the “Dirty 
War” was waged throughout the nation, the violence in Guerrero was especially intense, as the 
PdlP, ACNR and others infuriated the government by its successes in taking advantage of the 
state’s mountainous, rural terrain and its popular support among the mostly indigenous poor. 
Police and military forces applied brutal force against not only the guerillas, but also innocent 
civilians, engaging in extrajudicial killings, torture, and forced disappearances, terrorizing 
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villages throughout the state. The number of persons killed by the government during the “Dirty 
War” will never be known, but certainly thousands perished. A report by Guerrero’s Truth 
Commission released in October 2014 documented more than 200 cases of forced 
disappearances, a fraction of the estimated total.31 Some victims survived detention for years in 
clandestine prisons or on military bases, and were eventually released, but most were taken and 
never reappeared. Over time, the Mexican government’s counterinsurgency efforts succeeded in 
overwhelming the armed resistance. Vázquez died while on the run in February 1972 and the 
military finally managed to track down and kill Cabañas, along with his senior leadership, in 
December 1974. By applying huge increases in manpower, deadly force, and savage tactics 
toward suspected sympathizers, relatives, neighbors and rebels alike, the Mexican government 
managed to suppress the insurgency in Guerrero, but at great human and moral cost. 
 
 The absolute dominance of the PRI in Mexico ended in 2000, with the first truly 
contested national elections resulting in the election of President Vicente Fox (of the center-right 
National Action Party, or PAN). Until then, the PRI had accepted defeats at the hands of the 
PAN and the left-wing PRI splinter Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) at the local and 
state levels, while maintaining its grip on the presidency and the national government. The PRI 
had become increasingly discredited for its corruption and electoral fraud, as well as for its 
performance in addressing the economic crisis of 1994, providing the PAN and the PRD with an 
opening to achieve gains in 1997 legislative elections. With the PRI’s loss of the presidency 
Mexico entered a new era of multiparty democracy, in which other political parties could 
 






compete and win offices at every level. Prior to 2000, the PAN had managed to win the 
governorships of eight Mexican states, primarily in the north, while the PRD had won four, 
including Mexico City. The following decade saw the PRD win governorships in a dozen states, 
a large number of those in the south. In Guerrero, the PRD won the governorship in 2005 and 
again in 2011, while making similar progress at the municipal and level. 
 
 Unfortunately, in Guerrero’s case, breaking the political stranglehold of the PRI meant 
exchanging one corrupt or ineffective regime for another. While the PRD was formed in reaction 
to concerns that the PRI had abandoned its revolutionary and social justice roots, in practice 
many politicians simply switched party labels for political advantage. Most PRD leaders were 
former PRI members, who maintained or re-established their existing networks of political and 
economic connections, including with the drug cartels (there were many exceptions, especially 
early on; in the 1990’s local PRD members were even assassinated for their opposition). The 
second PRD governor of Guerrero, Ángel Aguirre Rivero, for example, abandoned his position 
in the PRI (as a senator) just months before running successfully for election in 2011. Aguirre 
was forced to step down as governor in October 2014 over his mishandling and suspected 
complicity in the Ayotzinapa case. One of the key figures in the Ayotzinapa kidnappings and 
murders, if not the mastermind, was another PRD official, Iguala mayor José Luis Abarca 
Velázquez. Abarca won election after backing Aguirre financially in his race, and brought with 
him close personal and operational ties to the Guerreros Unidos, as was later made clear. While 
the long single-party rule of the PRI in Mexico can be blamed for many political and social 
flaws, it is clear that the transition to multiparty democracy was not enough to clear out the 






 Political and social unrest in Guerrero has long been fueled by its extreme poverty and 
income inequality, which have improved over the past century with Mexico’s overall 
development, but continue to lag far behind the rest of the country. By most measures, Guerrero 
is one of the poorest states in Mexico, usually occupying next-to-last place, with neighboring 
Chiapas at the very bottom. According to a Mexican government review published in 2012, 67.6 
percent of Guerrero’s population lives in poverty, including 31.6 percent who live in conditions 
of extreme poverty. The “non-vulnerable” population of the state is just 7.3 percent, the second-
lowest percentage of Mexico’s 31 states.32 Guerrero is ranked next to last in terms of its intensity 
of poverty (according to social indicators such as education, housing, access to health services, 
access to food, etc.). The state was the only one categorized as “polarized,” registering high 
levels of marginalization, and it also registered at the bottom in terms of income inequality.33  
Wealth and power remain concentrated in the hands of a privileged minority, in other words, 
with effective segregation between those with means and the rest of the state’s population. 
Guerrero has several municipalities with the highest levels of extreme poverty (above 80 
percent) in the entire country. Not coincidentally, those municipalities and others in its range 
elsewhere in the country were overwhelmingly indigenous (over 70 percent speaking an 
indigenous language).34 Indigenous communities face significant socio-economic obstacles 
because of language and diminished access to social services; roughly one-fifth of Guerrero’s 
population is indigenous, with a large minority of those speaking little to no Spanish. 
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 Guerrero’s political turmoil, corruption, poverty, and geography all contributed to the 
state’s growth as a major producer of illegal drugs, and, with it, the devastating impact of violent 
crime.  The mountainous terrain is well suited to the cultivation of highly-profitable illicit crops, 
both in yields and the ability to evade detection (whether outright or by being remote enough to 
bribe or intimidate authorities into staying out of the way). From the 1960s Guerrero was a 
significant source of marijuana for the U.S. market, but it is estimated that now most marijuana 
production goes toward domestic consumption. Poppy cultivation and heroin production in 
Guerrero have skyrocketed since the mid-1990s, however, mostly feeding the U.S. demand that 
has increased significantly in recent years. Guerrero now ranks among the largest sources of 
heroin in the world, estimated in 2015 to produce between 50 and 70 percent of the entire 
country’s production, nearly all for the U.S. market.35  
 
 The organized criminal groups engaged in drug trafficking have drawn Guerrero into an 
ongoing violent conflict that resembles war or a country under siege. Mexican authorities 
responded to their rise by stepping up their presence and enforcement, as well as their eradication 
of illegal crops (as part of the nationwide “war on drugs,” which was augmented in 2006 by 
bringing in the Mexican military to supplement local, state and federal police forces). The “war 
on drugs” succeeded in making some high-profile arrests and seizures, but has largely failed to 
rein in the cartels, while drug-related violence has exploded. Guerrero recorded the highest rate 
of homicide of any Mexican state in the two years before the Ayotzinapa kidnappings, due to the 
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intense levels of violent attacks by organized criminal groups against rivals, the police, and the 
general public.36   
 
 The Beltrán Leyva group, affiliated with the Sinaloa cartel, dominated Guerrero from the 
late 1990s until the killing of Arturo Beltrán Leyva by Mexican marines in December 2009. 
Afterwards, the group fragmented into at least nine separate drug trafficking groups, which 
escalated the violence in the state even further, and without diminishing their strength relative to 
the government. Indeed, these various groups were as successful as the Beltrán Leyva brothers 
had been in infiltrating and co-opting local officials and security forces, and similarly effective in 
fighting or eluding authorities when necessary.  
 
 Among the drug-trafficking groups that were formed in the early 2010s was the 
Guerreros Unidos (literally, “United Warriors,” with the added significance of the state’s name), 
who would later be identified as among the killers of the Ayotzinapa students. Like their rivals, 
the Guerreros Unidos engage in a wide range of criminal activities, including kidnappings, 
extortion, contraband, and homicide, in addition to trafficking in heroin and marijuana. The 
Guerreros Unidos and other successor groups, moreover, were even more ferocious and 
predatory than their predecessor, using violence to send messages not only to their rivals but also 
to the general population, whose cooperation they hoped to secure through brutal intimidation. 
Kidnappings and killings soared, as the drug trafficking groups targeted both the relatively 
wealthy and people of modest means. One analyst writes that the Guerreros Unidos strengthened 
their hold on Iguala and Taxco by developing “among the most efficient extortion and 
 





kidnapping operations to be found in Mexico.”37 Safe houses were set up throughout the 
countryside, usually with burial grounds attached to dispose of the bodies of the victims, often 
whether ransoms were paid or not. In the search for the remains of the missing Ayotzinapa 
students in 2014 and onwards, many such sites were discovered by investigators, complicating 
their search but also revealing the scope of these crimes. 
  
 Confronted by state oppression, poverty and isolation, and drug gang violence, the people 
of Guerrero have also been made vulnerable by weak or complicit public institutions, and an 
underdeveloped and badly outmatched civil society. For many, the impunity and lack of 
accountability weigh as heavily as the crimes and abuses themselves. The Mexican government 
in Guerrero, from the municipal level up to the most senior national leadership, has for decades 
committed the most serious human rights violations in the name of preserving power, silencing 
dissent, and fighting criminal drug trafficking. Often the authorities have colluded with the 
criminal organizations.  Given the police and the military’s poor record in actually defeating the 
cartels, it remains an open question whether their failure is due to their complicity or their 
incompetence. In any case, the people of Guerrero know that they cannot depend on official law 
enforcement to keep them safe, and they know that they cannot expect that those officers who 
commit crimes in the “war on drugs” will be held responsible.   
 
 The judicial system in Guerrero, as elsewhere in Mexico, lacks credibility. Prosecutors 
act (or do not act) according to political direction from the executive and under influence from 
the cartels. The former president of the state congress’s Human Rights Commission, Jorge 
 





Salazar Marchán, characterized the judiciary in 2014 as “the most corrupt institution in 
Guerrero.”38 This view was shared by 62.7 percent of Guerrero citizens surveyed that same year, 
who agreed that the judicial system was “corrupt.”39  Officials implicated in serious crimes not 
only escaped punishment but were sometimes elevated: after the murder by police of two 
Ayotzinapa students in 2011, a federal police officer involved, Alfredo Álvarez, was named by 
Governor Aguirre as chief of police in Acapulco, the state’s largest and most crime-ridden city.  
As in so many such cases, no one was ever prosecuted for those deaths. 
 
 In response to the widespread lack of confidence in the police, volunteers in Guerrero 
began forming informal “community police” forces in the mid-1990s to supplement or even 
serve as a more effective and responsive alternative to state and municipal police. Organized by 
rural indigenous groups, agricultural cooperatives, and church activists, among others, these 
community police were initially seen by some as a possible model for police reform. Over time, 
however, these volunteers suffered abuse and pressure from their official counterparts, and, even 
worse, came to be seen as equally subject to corruption and intimidation from drug traffickers.  
 
 With low levels of trust in the police and justice system, and no meaningful alternatives, 
citizens in Guerrero have become reluctant to even report crimes. No doubt, the highest rates of 
homicide, kidnapping and other violent crimes registered in Guerrero are, in fact, some fraction 
of their true levels. According to Mexican government surveys in 2014, 95.8 percent of crimes 
went unreported in Guerrero, including 99.0 percent of extortion cases. Fully 86.8 per cent of 
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Guerrero citizens judged their situations as “unsafe,” one of the highest percentages in the 
country.40 
  
 Caught between corrupt, abusive or useless authorities on one hand and brutal criminal 
organizations on the other, the people of Guerrero have found limited space for the development 
of civil society organizations.  The first civic groups organized in the state focused primarily on 
land, labor, and other local issues, along with other, broadly-oriented human rights advocacy 
groups in the early 1990s.  Campesinos, teachers, and indigenous activists, some supported by 
the Catholic and other church groups, formed associations and demonstrated for their rights, 
frequently drawing forceful responses from government and PRI authorities who sought to 
discredit them as criminals or violent revolutionaries. The OCSS (Organización Campesina de la 
Sierra del Sur), for example, had been formed for just a year and a half when 17 of its members 
were killed by police in the June 1995 “Aguas Blancas” massacre. Among the first groups 
dedicated to human rights violations were associations of family members of the disappeared, 
joining forces with a national-level group, the Association of Relatives of the Detained, 
Disappeared and Victims of Human Rights Abuses (AFADEM), which had been founded back 
in 1977. Groups such as the Voice for Those Without a Voice Human Rights Committee and the 
Tlachinollan Human Rights Center (which remains among the most prominent Guerrero human 
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rights groups to this day, providing legal services and advocacy to rural populations) were 
established in the early 1990s.41  
  
 The appeals of Guerrero human rights organizations had long been largely ignored by 
Mexican authorities, however, despite successes in raising popular and international awareness 
of their concerns. A public, state-level commission for human rights was established in 1990, but 
its impact was limited. As the Human Rights Commission became more stridently critical of the 
state government, it was effectively shut down; in June 2014 Guerrero Governor Aguirre – 
without legal authority – removed the president of the commission and replaced him with a 
political ally. Frustrated by efforts to seek justice on individual cases of disappearances, 
extrajudicial killings, and other violations by police and military forces, human rights 
organizations began to look past their state and national institutions toward international 
organizations for assistance.  Mexican authorities could not be counted on to investigate and 
prosecute their own crimes, even those of many years in the past. The creation in 2001 of a 
Special Prospector to investigate the “Dirty War” was initially viewed with hope in Guerrero, but 
soon it became evident that the body would neither fulfill its mandate nor protect witnesses; the 
office closed down five years later, with its report ignored by the government and no one 
convicted. In desperation, human rights groups turned to the Organization of American States’ 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and various UN human rights bodies, 
including its system of special rapporteurs. In those multilateral organizations their appeals were 
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heard, and in some cases provisional remedies (medidas cautelares) were even issued, however 
often ignored or otherwise not implemented by Mexican authorities. 
 
 It was in this oppressive and bleak environment that the kidnappings and murders of the 
Ayotzinapa students took place, in an impoverished, rural state long dominated by political 
elites, terrorized by drug traffickers and security forces, and characterized by outrageous 
impunity. For the families of the victims, the reality of those brutal crimes was all too familiar – 

































Chapter 3: The Facts of the Case 
 
 In order to understand the human rights responses to the Ayotzinapa case, the background 
details and the disagreement about critical facts in the case must be examined, as they drove 
popular demands for accountability. Given the scale of the operation and the number of 
eyewitnesses in a mostly urban setting, Mexican authorities had to concede publicly that 
municipal police were involved, but quickly pushed a narrative that excluded any state or federal 
involvement. They also put responsibility for the disappearances on a prominent drug cartel and 
maintained that they were certain that all the missing students had been killed. In doing so, the 
Mexican government provoked a backlash by angry families, activists and other observers who 
saw the official line – with its proposed sequence of events and motive for the crimes – as an 
obvious cover-up designed to divert blame and make the case “go away.” 
 
 Reports of the attacks on the students the evening of September 26, 2014, with some 
allowances for initial confusion in media accounts, were generally consistent even from the first 
day. Dozens of Ayotzinapa students survived the attacks, joined by other students, local teachers, 
and journalists whom they alerted as the first police assaults were underway. With so many 
witnesses, Guerrero state and federal authorities were forced to acknowledge that police had, at a 
minimum, used deadly force against unarmed students in multiple locations, and accepted most 
of the basic facts reported by the students and others. Their investigations and conclusions about 






Among the first national media accounts of the Iguala attacks were published in the 
Mexican dailies El Universal and La Jornada, documenting in detail the accounts provided by 
the students and confirmed by state authorities.42 43 Both articles, which were published early 
September 28, indicated that municipal police and presumed criminals opened fire on several 
separate occasions, killing six people and wounding dozens more.  Although the El Universal 
report provided a detailed timeline of the attacks, complete with maps and graphics, neither 
account reported on the attacks on two other buses commandeered by Ayotzinapa students 
elsewhere in the city (one of which accounted for roughly half of those who were kidnapped). 
Guerrero state prosecutors were cited as reporting that the entire Iguala municipal police force 
had been disarmed pending the ongoing investigation, but claimed not to know why Ayotzinapa 
students were maintaining that at least 25 of their classmates were missing. La Jornada reported 
that the surviving students alleged that state and federal police had taken part in the attacks, in 
addition to the municipal police. In the days that followed these initial reports, more details about 
the full extent of the attacks and the precise number of missing became public and widely 
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 The sequence of events on September 26 and 27 has been well documented in the reports 
44 45 of the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI, in Spanish) named by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which also documented the Mexican 
government’s flawed investigations and conclusions (as will be addressed in the following 
chapter), and in accounts collected by journalists such as Anabel Hernández 46 and John Gibler. 
47 All this information was assembled in a comprehensive multimedia project 48 by the 
University of London’s Forensic Architecture group, at the request of the Argentine Forensic 
Anthropology Team (EEAF, in Spanish) and the human rights group Centro de Derechos 
Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez (Centro Prodh, which has worked as advocates for the 
victims’ families). The following timeline draws on the above sources, which are nearly 
completely consistent with each other. 
  
 For the October 2 commemoration of the Tlatelolco massacre, the Ayotzinapa students 
had been tasked with coming up with transportation to the events in Mexico City for a number of 
rural teachers colleges nationwide, for which they planned to commandeer about fifteen intercity 
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buses.49 By September 26 they had managed to secure just a handful. The students had found the 
bus terminal and other likely sites in the nearby state capital, Chilpancingo, guarded by an 
unusually heavy police presence, and so decided to try their luck in Iguala, about two hours’ 
drive north of the school-- Iguala being Guerrero’s third-largest city, with a population of around 
100,000. At around six o’clock the afternoon of September 26, eighty to ninety students set out 
from the Raúl Isidro Burgos Rural Teachers College to Iguala, riding in two buses (“Estrella de 
Oro” bus company, numbers 1531 and 1568) that they had taken days earlier in Chilpancingo, 
before security there tightened.50 
 
 The two buses stopped in separate locations just outside Iguala, at a highway rest stop 
and a toll booth, where the normalistas began approaching cars for donations (another 
longstanding practice of the rural teaching students) and scouting for buses to take over. At 
approximately 8:30 p.m., the students with Estrella de Oro 1531 stopped an Iguala-bound 
passenger bus, whose driver agreed to allow them to take the bus, but on condition that he be 
allowed to first drop off his passengers at the city-center terminal. About ten students boarded 
that bus for the trip to the station, but were then locked inside the bus (presumably by the driver) 
at the terminal after the passengers had gotten off.51 At that point, the normalistas on board the 
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 The Ayotzinapa students maintain that they had not planned on entering the city center, 
perhaps fearing stepped-up security at the terminal as they had seen in Chilpancingo. Upon 
arriving at the Iguala bus station, however, the students on the first two buses were able to free 
their trapped classmates quickly, and saw that the lightly-guarded station offered them an 
opportunity to pick up several buses at once.53  They moved fast, fanning out and taking three 
buses: “Costa Line” 2012 and 2510 and “Estrella Roja” 3278. With five buses now under their 
control, the students headed out of the terminal at about 9:20 p.m., with the two Costa Line and 
two Estrella de Oro buses heading north, and the Estrella Roja departing by a separate entrance 
to the south (the differing routes were likely due to unfamiliarity with the city layout and the 
need to move quickly to evade a police response).54 
 
 Police attempted to stop the Costa Line buses and Estrella de Oro 1568 six blocks north 
of the station, near the city square, by firing warning shots into the air, but the small convoy 
managed to get past them. At that point, the last bus in that group, Estrella de Oro 1531, broke 
off and turned to the east, presumably to avoid the police but also along a more direct route 
toward Ayotzinapa.55 The group of three buses continued north along the same road, until 
reaching a police blockade some fifteen blocks farther north, just before ten o’clock. Some of the 
students exited their buses to attempt to push a police vehicle out the way, when the police began 
to open fire.56 One student was shot in the head, delivering a wound that left him in a permanent 
vegetative state. A number of police vehicles arrived behind the stopped buses and opened fire 
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on the last bus, Estrella de Oro 1568, riddling it with bullets and injuring several students on 
board. For reasons that remain unknown, the students from that bus, with one exception, were 
brought together on the ground beside the bus, loaded onto police patrol vehicles, and taken 
away.57 They were never seen again alive. A few of the students were removed from the scene 
by an ambulance, but the rest of them remained near the damaged buses as the police left the 
area. The normalistas indicated later that they were determined to stay and preserve the crime 
scene, marking shell casings with stones and beginning to alert others, including classmates on 
the other buses and back at Ayotzinapa. Two vans of more senior students left at once from 
Ayotzinapa to Iguala, reaching out by phone to contacts at Iguala schools and the local news 
media along the way.58 
  
 At roughly the same time as the attack on the three buses in the north of Iguala, police 
stopped and attacked the second Estrella de Oro bus, which had traveled about four miles before 
it was stopped under an overpass in front of the city’s courthouse, Palacio de Justicia. There, 
police destroyed the bus and tear-gassed the students on board, forcing them outside.  All the 
occupants, except for the bus driver, were then forced onto police vehicles and driven away.59 
Those young men joined those taken on the other Estrella de Oro bus to become known as the 
Ayotzinapa 43, the disappeared. 
 
 Shortly after the assault on that bus, police stopped the Estrella Roja bus travelling on the 
same road, not far behind. In contrast to the other attacks, there was no gunfire and the students 
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were allowed to disembark before the driver of the bus was sent onwards. The normalistas fled 
into the surrounding neighborhoods, and into hiding as police patrols searched for them 
overnight.60 
 
 Yet another bus, this one transporting members of the Los Avispones youth soccer team 
from their match in Iguala back to Chilpancingo, was attacked by police and suspected criminals 
on the main road south at approximately 11:30 pm. The attackers opened fire on the bus, killing 
one passenger and mortally wounding the driver. At first, they attempted to force the players off 
the bus, but fled the scene when they realized that the bus was carrying a soccer team (and not 
students that they had presumably been ordered to intercept).  The attackers killed a passenger in 
a nearby taxi and wounded several others.61  
 
 Back at the site of the first bloody attack on the three buses in the north of Iguala, the 
Ayotzinapa students had organized a small press conference to denounce the police violence, 
with local news media and teachers in attendance. At about 12:30 a.m., heavily-armed men in 
plain black gear approached and began opening fire on the assembled group and the other 
normalistas on the scene.62 The sudden explosion of weapons fire occurred as one of the students 
was describing the earlier attack to reporters. People immediately ran for cover, behind the 
destroyed, abandoned buses, beneath parked cars or in doorways. Whether by design or by luck, 
just two persons were killed among the wounded.63 Given that their targets had been caught by 
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surprise in the open, the relatively few fatalities suggest that the attackers may have meant to 
terrorize the assembled group rather than assassinate them.  
 
 Most of the students then escaped to safety, hiding overnight until they could gather to 
report their experiences to state authorities. One Ayotzinapa student was captured in the 
aftermath, however; his mutilated body was found the next morning not far from the scene, the 
victim of gruesome torture and the sixth fatality that day in Iguala at the hands of Mexican 
authorities and/or organized crime.64 
 
 In contrast to the earlier attacks on the students, the final assault was carried out not by 
uniformed police, but by a paramilitary-style force without identification on their clothing or 
vehicles; according to various account and theories, these men were either municipal police in 
disguise, some military or other special unit, or narco-traffickers (e.g., members of the Guerreros 
Unidos). Although Mexican state and federal officials and investigators would insist otherwise, 
the other attacks that evening were carried out by uniformed officers from many different forces, 
principally members of the Iguala municipal police and municipal police from the neighboring 
cities of Cocula and Huitzuco, but joined by Guerrero state police, federal police, and members 
of the Mexican army.65 
 
 With so many survivors and eyewitnesses to the series of coordinated attacks on the 
Ayotzinapa students, as well as to the apparently mistaken assault on the bus of soccer players, 
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Mexican authorities largely avoided challenging the basic facts of the attacks themselves. What 
they did do, however, was immediately work to limit the responsibility for the crimes to local 
authorities – denying not what happened that night in Iguala, but all evidence of higher-level 
involvement by the state. To do so, they also put forward motivations for the attacks and 
explanations for what happened afterwards that were seen by the survivors, families, and other 
observers as not credible, at best, and intentionally false, at worst.  
  
 In assigning blame to local police and narco-traffickers, state and federal authorities also 
had to provide some rationale or motive for the crimes. As we will see in the following chapter, 
Mexican authorities sought from the outset to place the blame on local officials and drug 
traffickers, suppressing evidence that did not fit that narrative.  According to their account, 
Iguala Mayor José Luis Abarca and his wife, María de los Ángeles Pineda Villa, supported by 
the Guerreros Unidos drug cartel, and corrupt municipal police, gave the order to attack the 
Ayotzinapa students because they feared they were coming to disrupt a political event hosted by 
Pineda Villa. The police had turned over the missing students to members of the Guerreros 
Unidos, who mistook them for rival drug traffickers, perhaps from the Los Rojos group. Such 
claims were not supported by the evidence, however. Pineda Villa’s event had concluded by the 
time the students arrived in the city center, and the idea that drug traffickers would confuse 
busloads of unarmed students with their rivals seems laughable. The victims’ families and their 
advocates recognized the government’s explanations as unbelievable, a view subsequently 






 We may never know with any certainty what happened to the missing Ayotzinapa 
students or why they were attacked, but the Mexican government’s conclusions in late 2014 rang 
so false and transparently self-serving that it immediately put authorities into conflict with those 
seeking truth and accountability for the crimes. Moreover, years of government abuses and 
corruption had conditioned the families and other human rights activists to be deeply suspicious. 
To nearly all outside of government, one thing about the crimes in Iguala was clear: “fue el 
estado” – “it was the state.”   
 
 Beyond the conviction that the government was responsible, no fully satisfactory 
explanation for the events of September 26 has been proposed, neither for the motives for 
targeting the students, nor for the disappearance of about half their number.  Many aspects of the 
case make no sense, even given the climate of extreme violence and corruption that prevails in 
the region. Why were the unarmed students – who posed no obvious threat and whose 
commandeering of buses was a long-tolerated practice – attacked at all? Why did the police 
and/or criminal organizations decide to attack the buses in the city, rather than wait for them in 
the countryside, where there would be fewer witnesses? Why were only some students taken, and 
the rest left alone? Why were the kidnapped students killed, and why did the perpetrators try to 
ensure that their bodies would never be discovered? 
 
 Many theories about the crimes have focused on the buses as the real target of the 
coordinated attacks. The GIEI noted that U.S. law enforcement had determined that narco-
traffickers sometimes used intercity buses to smuggle heroin from Guerrero to the U.S.66 Noting 
 





also that early government accounts had omitted references to the Estrella Roja bus and that 
there were numerous discrepancies in evidence about that bus, the GIEI speculated that the 
Estrella Roja bus may have contained drugs or money that criminal groups were determined to 
recover.67 The Estrella Roja bus, in contrast to the other buses attacked, was emptied of 
passengers and ordered to continue onward before being intercepted again. In this scenario, the 
normalistas seized the drug traffickers’ bus by accident, sending corrupt police forces to 
scramble to go after every bus matching its profile. However, in that case the police would not 
have been able to mount such a coordinated operation, involving multiple security forces nearly 
simultaneously, with practically no advance notice. It also does not explain why some students 
were taken away and killed, especially given that the Estrella Roja bus and any illicit cargo were 
recovered without incident. 
 
 Other theories look at the two Estrella de Oro buses as a motive.  Perhaps, the thinking 
goes, it was those two buses that the Ayotzinapa students had seized days earlier in Chilpancingo 
that had been carrying contraband, rather than the Estrella Roja bus. Those buses were the ones 
most violently attacked by police, and from which the 43 disappeared had been taken – only 
from those two buses, in fact. Police acting on behalf of drug traffickers could have removed the 
passengers from those buses to cover up removal of drugs or money that had been hidden on 
them. Such an explanation accounts for why the police forces could have been prepared to 
launch a coordinated raid in Iguala, as Mexican security (via a shared C-4 information system) 
had been tracking the movement of the normalistas that day.68 It does not explain, however, why 
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the police and drug traffickers waited until the buses traveled to another city, when they could 
have seized them at the teachers college or on the road at any time in the previous two days. 
Neither does it explain why the kidnapped students had to be killed and their bodies hidden or 
destroyed beyond identification. 
 
 Although most accounts emphasize that the practice of commandeering buses was a 
common practice tolerated by law enforcement, at the same time the Ayotzinapa students were 
regarded by Mexican authorities as troublesome delinquents, and even a political or security 
threat. Many ordinary people of Guerrero supported the normalistas’ efforts and donated freely, 
and some of the bus drivers reportedly welcomed the opportunity for a break from their regular 
schedule.69 Many others, however, regarded the activist, leftist students with suspicion, fear, and 
hostility, especially within the government and among the social elite. The Ayotzinapa students’ 
marches and protests had often been met with a violent police response.  In December 2011, 
police opened fire on protesting normalistas, killing two, and less than a year later, a bus 
transporting Ayotzinapa students was boarded by armed and masked men, threatening the young 
men with being “burned alive” if they kept protesting.70 Guerrero Governor Aguirre publicly 
denounced the teachers college on numerous occasions, most clearly in a May 2013 television 
interview, in which he argued that Ayotzinapa “has become a kind of bunker” that neither federal 
nor state forces can access. “It has become a place that has been used by some groups to 
indoctrinate these youths and cultivate social resentment amongst them,” Guerrero said, 
maintaining that they are being indoctrinated by “insomniac guerillas.”71  Anabel Hernández 
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claims that Ayotzinapa was viewed as a security threat at the highest levels of government, and 
that their political activism in Guerrero ranked among priority “governability” concerns in 
briefing materials prepared for President Peña Nieto’s transition in 2012.72 
 
 With all this in mind, it is conceivable that the shocking violence deployed against the 
Ayotzinapa students on September 26 had no clear trigger or motive, other than that the Mexican 
government chose that time to strike out brutally against a perceived enemy.  Certainly, all the 
forces reported as involved in the attacks, including the military, the federal, state and municipal 
police, would have been inclined to favor decisive action against the young Marxists and what 
they viewed as potential future revolutionaries – however unarmed. What still remains unclear, 
and perhaps forever unknowable, is why the operation took the turn it did, attacking the students 
in an urban area with many witnesses, and disappearing just half of the group, without a trace. 
  
 None of these theories or lines of inquiry were pursued by the Mexican government, 
which was forced to accept many widely-reported facts about the case but refused to address 
many fundamental questions. Instead, the authorities offered explanations that were so 
transparently self-exculpatory and even nonsensical that they provoked outrage among the 
victims’ families and other members of civil society. Even for a people long accustomed to lies 
and impunity, the state’s acknowledgement of a horrific crime, for which it admitted no real 









Chapter 4: Official Obstruction and Cover-Up 
 
 The Mexican government approached the crimes committed in Iguala with the clear 
objectives of evading responsibility and closing the case as quickly as possible, thereby limiting 
the political damage to the Peña Nieto administration. It did so by perpetrating a cover-up, 
through a combination of inaction, suppression of evidence, coerced testimony, and misdirection. 
The state created a narrative aimed at blunting the growing popular demands for accountability 
and preserving its own longstanding impunity. 
 
 Because of the scale of the attacks, in heavily-populated areas with many witnesses and 
survivors, and especially because of the continued disappearance of several dozen young people, 
the Mexican government could not simply deny or explain away the crimes, and allow the issue 
to fade – as it had done so many times in the past. Despite many public assertions of their 
determination to solve the case and ensure justice, the authorities abandoned meaningful efforts 
to investigate, instead putting on a show of doing so while working to come up with some 
explanation that would minimize political damage. Unfortunately for the government, however, 
its arguments and explanations ran counter to the public’s understanding of the local situation, 
the known facts of the case, and common sense.  
 
 Whether intentionally, or because of incompetence and habitual disregard for proper 
procedure, Mexican authorities at the state and federal level badly bungled their  
investigations into the crimes, from the very first hours. What could be attributed to sloppiness or 





gave way to a sustained, deliberate effort by Mexican authorities to pursue only a line of inquiry 
that supported the government’s interest – including through the use of torture and planting of 
evidence. 
 
 The municipal police that night in Iguala provided no assistance or protection to 
survivors on the scene. After shooting up the buses and kidnapping roughly half of the students, 
the police abandoned the locations of the attacks and left the students alone. Following the attack 
against the three buses in the north of the city, local journalist Rodrigo Montes recalled that, 
“there was a period of hours during which nothing happened. No authorities arrived at any point. 
Nobody. When I got there, around eleven-thirty, no authorities were present. The area hadn’t 
been cordoned off. There were no soldiers, no detectives, no police, nobody.”73 The other 
students, local teachers, and journalists who gathered there were therefore completely vulnerable 
when masked gunmen attacked the assembled group. Elsewhere, Ayotzinapa students were 
pursued and shot at by municipal police (and likely others) through the night, as they scattered 
throughout Iguala neighborhoods.   
 
 Meanwhile, no other Mexican authorities came to the aid of the attack victims, despite 
being alerted to the shootings in multiple locations – not the state police, federal police, state 
prosecutor’s office, nor the army. Federal police who arrived at the scene of the shooting of the 
soccer team bus outside the city inexplicably failed to aid the wounded. Members of the military 
interrogated normalistas seeking treatment for wounded colleagues in a local private clinic, 
preventing them from getting medical help there and refusing to call an ambulance as they 
 





expelled them from the premises.74 Guerrero state police and senior officials received official 
reports as early as 9:35 p.m. that shootings had taken place in various locations, but not until 
after midnight did investigators arrive at any of the crime scenes (first at the site of the attack 
against Estrella de Oro bus 1531, in front of the Palacio de Justicia). Authorities did not show up 
at the site of the attacks on the three buses in the north until 3:20 am, more than five hours after 
the students were first attacked and many of them kidnapped (and three hours after the second 
assault during the press conference).75 
  
 When state investigators finally began to process the crime scenes, they conducted their 
investigation with a carelessness that reflected both their apparent ineptitude and their motivation 
– whether on orders or based on understanding of what their superiors expected – to avoid a 
thorough inquiry that could damage the government.  As the review by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights’ GIEI establishes in detail, neither the Guerrero state-level nor 
Mexican federal-level investigators adhered to established criminal investigatory practice or to 
internationally-recognized procedures (among others, the “Minnesota Protocol,” the UN’s 
manual for investigating such crimes committed by state actors).76 The Minnesota Protocol, 
adopted in 1991 and amended in 2016, reminds states of their obligations to recover and protect 
physical evidence, interview all potential witnesses, ensure transparency, and strive for 
effectiveness, independence, and neutrality – while avoiding any “predetermined outcome.” 
States should also consider in many cases the establishment of special commissions of inquiry 
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with broad powers to achieve these objectives.77 Instead, the Mexican government failed to 
investigate the Iguala attacks and disappearances even by the standards of an ordinary crime, let 
alone a crime committed by the police in a large-scale, coordinated operation. 
 
 That failure to investigate properly included an extraordinary number of violations of 
standard procedure. The GIEI determined that none of the crime scenes were properly secured 
and processed, allowing for possible contamination and loss of valuable physical evidence. 
Investigators did not document the locations thoroughly with photographs and video, they 
ignored or mixed together ballistic evidence such as shell casings, and they made no attempt to 
collect blood, hair, and fiber samples. The damaged buses were towed away and not inspected 
for evidence until fifty days after the crimes. Investigators bagged clothing and other items 
belonging to the victims, but did not process them as evidence nor share them with their families 
to confirm their identities.  No effort was made for weeks and even months to obtain security 
camera and other surveillance video footage from the time of the attacks, by which point most 
was no longer available. In the case of cameras mounted on the courthouse building (Palacio de 
Justicia) directly opposite the scene of the attack on Estrella de Oro bus 1531, recorded footage 
was “accidently” deleted. Investigators failed to do more than a quick visual inspection of the 
Iguala police station, and did not review its logs or question on-duty officers and other potential 
witnesses. They also failed to examine telephone records of the disappeared students. 
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Questioning of potential witnesses was haphazard at best; the investigators did not even 
interview the bus drivers until six months after the attacks.78 
  
 The state’s search for the disappeared Ayotzinapa students was similarly flawed, 
particularly during the first critical hours and days immediately after the attacks. In its review of 
the actions taken by state investigators, federal police, and the military, the GIEI concluded that 
the search effort lacked a coherent plan and coordination, failed to adhere to professional 
guidelines, and consisted mostly of forces patrolling the area looking for students, rather than 
attempting to determine to where and by whom they had been taken.79 Guerrero authorities 
ordered a search for students as early as 3 a.m. the night of the attacks, but police were sent to 
look for those who had survived the attacks and fled throughout the city – not those that had been 
kidnapped.80 Only when parents of the missing students arrived in Iguala the next day asking for 
the return of sons they assumed were being temporarily held by police somewhere, and after the 
Ayotzinapa students provided a list of 68 students unaccounted for (later reduced to 57 and then 
the final 43), did authorities begin a full-scale search for them.  
  
To the casual observer, the government’s search for the missing students suggested a lot 
of activity and significant resources devoted to the effort. Police were dispatched on patrols, the 
federal highway police set up numerous checkpoints, and helicopters flew overhead to look for 
the students from the air. But the authorities – whether due to incompetence or by deliberate 
obstruction – moved too late and too sloppily to do much more than put on a public show of 
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action. The GIEI found the government search lacking in many essential aspects. Mexican 
authorities failed to inform their search by interviewing survivors and family members, 
analyzing crime scene evidence, reviewing the C-4 integrated government security 
communications and intelligence logs, or even interrogating the 22 Iguala municipal police who 
had been detained for their role in the attacks, based on eyewitness identification.81 The 
government was looking for the missing students while effectively ignoring evidence that could 
provide some sense of direction about where to find them. 
 
 At the same time that they were bungling the investigation and search, Mexican 
authorities insisted from the start that the Iguala attacks were a local issue, committed only by 
municipal police and whose investigation came under the jurisdiction of the Guerrero state. In 
his first press appearance the day after the attacks, the state prosecutor general, Iñaki Blanco 
Cabrera, announced that the municipal police had attempted to stop the takeover of buses and 
“engaged in excessive use of force” against the students.  At the same event, Guerrero Secretary 
General of Government (head of internal security) Jesús Martínez Garnelo stated that there was 
“no sign” of the presence of higher-level security forces in the crimes (despite eyewitness 
testimony to the contrary) and that responsibility therefore went to the Iguala mayor and the 
city’s police forces.82 As Anabel Hernández notes, these initial statements sought to portray the 
attacks and disappearances as an “open and shut case,” with local police bearing “ultimate 
responsibility.” 83  President Peña Nieto reinforced that message, declaring shortly afterwards 
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that, while he “lamented” what had occurred in Iguala, it was up to state-level authorities – not 
the national government – to handle the case. Federal authorities would coordinate with the 
Guerrero investigators, Peña Nieto declared, but demanded that “the state government assume its 
own responsibility,” arguing that the national government “cannot replace or assume the 
responsibilities that correspond strictly to local governments.” 84 The Mexican government sent a 
clear signal that it wanted to limit the investigation and contain the political damage. 
 
 With no sign of the missing students and little to show for their investigation, however, 
pressure grew on the government to demonstrate progress to bring the case to a close. The 
national attorney general’s office finally asserted jurisdiction over the case on October 4, 2014, 
although the state attorney general’s investigation continued in parallel – without proper sharing 
of case files and evidence until much later, further hampering the inquiry.85 Indeed, within days 
of the federal PGR joining the case, Amnesty International criticized the investigation as 
“chaotic and hostile,” lacking coordination and technical expertise – criticism later voiced in 
greater detail by the GIEI.86  
 
 Just as the federal government was stepping in, state-level authorities announced that 
they had obtained confessions from alleged members of the Guerreros Unidos narcotics 
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trafficking gang, which led them to the buried remains of at least 28 bodies in nearby Pueblo 
Viejo. Although the timing of the federal intervention seems unusual given those developments, 
it is possible that the national government either aided the state in securing those confessions, or 
moved in to “close the deal” and press the state to wrap up its case as quickly as possible. In 
announcing the confessions and Pueblo Viejo discovery on October 5, Guerrero prosecutor 
Blanco Cabrera provided a clear explanation of the case, asserting that after kidnapping the 
Ayotzinapa students, the Iguala municipal police turned them over to Guerreros Unidos 
members, who then murdered them and disposed of their bodies outside of the city.  Blanco 
Cabrera noted that DNA testing would be required to confirm the identities of the discovered 
bodies, but expected confirmation within several weeks to two months.  Meanwhile, other 
clandestine burial sites were being investigated and authorities continued their search for Iguala 
Mayor Abarca, who was still on the run.87  Unfortunately for the government’s efforts to wrap up 
its case, international forensics experts from the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team – 
brought into the investigation after sustained appeals from the families and human rights groups 
– quickly determined that none of the remains recovered at Pueblo Viejo or any other site were 
those of the missing 43 students.88 
  
 Both state and federal investigators proceeded in the weeks that followed to round up 
more suspected Guerreros Unidos members and local municipal police, interrogating them to 
provide (however often conflicting) information that supported the government’s “theory of the 
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case” – that Mayor Albarca had ordered the attacks and drug traffickers killed the missing 
students, destroying their remains.  Mexican Attorney General Jesús Murillo Karam and the head 
of the national Criminal Investigations Agency, Tomás Zerón de Lucio, announced October 22 
that authorities had captured one of the leaders of the Guerreros Unidos organization (Sidronio 
Casarrubias Salgado) days earlier. Murillo Karam maintained that the testimony of those 
detained and other evidence indicated that the attacks on the Ayotzinapa students were carried 
out by local police working in conjunction with Guerreros Unidos, “with the intention of 
preventing a group of people from disrupting the celebratory event to be held by the mayor and 
his wife on that night in Iguala.”89 (In fact, that event – for a family development program 
organized by Abarca’s wife, María de los Ángeles Pineda – had actually concluded by the time 
that the normalistas arrived in the Iguala city center.) Murillo Karam highlighted Pineda’s family 
ties to the narco-traffickers and her own political ambitions, and reported that the order to attack 
had come directly from “A-5,” the code name for Mayor Abarca.  The attorney general 
maintained that the Guerreros Unidos, for their part, had mistaken the Ayotzinapa students for 
members of a rival drug gang known as “Los Rojos,” and eliminated them to defend their 
territory.”90  
 
 At this point, the Mexican government had put together a theory that offered a motive 
(however implausible) for the attacks, but had not yet accounted for what happened to the 
missing 43. Murillo Karam’s intended message was clear: the government’s arrests (including 36 
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municipal police officers and 17 Guerreros Unidos operatives so far) were bringing the case ever 
nearer to a close.91 All that remained, from the government’s perspective, was to produce 
evidence of the kidnapped students’ deaths. 
 
 This last piece the Mexican government secured through coerced testimony from the 
accused Guerreros Unidos members and local police, and through the likely planting of real 
physical evidence.  In reviewing records of interrogations of suspects, Anabel  Hernández found 
that “each one provided a different version of how the normalistas were attacked and taken 
away, and where they ended up.”92 Pueblo Viejo had been named as a burial site, then disproven, 
and so the government moved on to other locations offered up by the detained, along with the 
various other mass graves that turned up in the course of searching by families, experts, and 
authorities. The nearby hills of La Parota were the focus for a time, until the government 
investigators finally settled on a trash dump outside the neighboring town of Cocula for their 
official version. Soon the government would piece together testimony to support an increasingly 
detailed story centered on the trash dump as the site of the destruction of the victims’ remains.  
  
 The Mexican government got the answers it wanted from Guerreros Unidos members and 
municipal police officers through beatings and torture, as has been amply documented by the 
GIEI and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).93 94  The GIEI was 
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assisted in its review of medical reports demonstrating post-detention injuries by experts from 
the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT), a non-governmental 
organization dedicated to assisting torture victims and promoting accountability for such crimes. 
These reports confirmed in detail that the principal sources of information about the Cocula 
dump, the burning of the normalistas’ remains there, and the role of the Iguala and Cocula police 
in turning the captured students over to the Guerreros Unidos, showed clear signs of abuse and 
torture while being interrogated by Mexican authorities.95 Such treatment, though a clear 
violation of Mexican law, international law (including the Convention Against Torture), and 
fundamental human rights, remains widespread in Mexico, and – as is often the case – was aimed 
at securing testimony to fit the investigators’ theories about the crime.  The detainees, under 
torture, told Murillo Karam’s team what they wanted to hear:  that the attacks and murders of the 
Ayotzinapa students were committed entirely by local authorities, working with narco-
traffickers, and that the bodies of those killed were burned beyond all recognition. 
 
 But the Mexican government went far beyond beating false confessions out of suspects. 
Determined to close the case at all costs, federal investigators not only pushed the theory that the 
students’ bodies had been “incinerated completely, due to which even if some remains are 
discovered, it might be impossible to identify them” (an assertion made even before any physical 
evidence was discovered),96 but they arranged to “discover” incinerated human remains, most 
likely by planting the evidence themselves.  On October 29, 2014, government forensics teams, 
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acting on information allegedly provided by Guerreros Unidos member Agustín García Reyes 
and others, located black plastic bags containing cremated human bones at the San Juan River 
not far from the Cocula dump. One of those bone fragments was later positively identified by 
DNA analysis (via the Argentine team and a laboratory at the University of Innsbruck, Austria) 
as belonging to Alexander Mora Venancio, one of the missing 43. It eventually came to light, 
however, that Mexican authorities, led by Tomás Zerón and accompanied by Agustín García 
Reyes, visited the river site the day before, on October 28, during which time they had ample 
opportunity to plant evidence, including the bone fragment later confirmed as belonging to one 
of the victims.  (The GIEI presented video footage of that visit to the public in April 2016.) 97 It 
is not known from where the Mexican government could have obtained the incinerated remains, 
including the piece definitively tied to the missing students, but all signs point to federal 
authorities at least having access to such evidence. It was later determined that the remains could 
not have arrived at the river site as described by the supposed perpetrators, meaning that either 
the Mexican government knew how they came to be there by some other means, or they put them 
there themselves. 
  
 On November 7, 2014, Mexican Attorney General Jesús Murillo Karam held a press 
conference in which he laid out the government’s official version of the crimes.  While noting 
that the investigation would continue and that the 43 students would be considered to be 
“missing,” Murillo Karam presented his findings as conclusive: the students had been attacked 
by local police forces on orders from Mayor Abarca and those seized were turned over to the 
Guerreros Unidos, who killed them at the Cocula dump, burned them, and dumped their remains 
 





in plastic bags in the river.  Murillo Karam praised the Mexican government’s efforts in “one of 
the most extensive criminal investigations in recent memory” and a “massive search,” “one of 
the most complex operations in recent times.”98 The attorney general played numerous videos of 
testimony from the detained Guerreros Unidos members, who maintained that they had piled the 
bodies of “over 40” students onto a massive pyre of tires, firewood, plastic, ignited by gasoline 
and diesel fuel, which burned continuously for at least fourteen hours.  Murillo Karam took 
about thirty minutes of questions from skeptical journalists (during which he displayed absolute 
confidence in his findings and dismissed any suggestion that the military had been involved in 
the attacks), and then concluded his appearance with the infamous remark, “ya me cansé” (“I’m 
tired,” or “I’ve had enough”).99 A little more than two months later, on January 27, 2015, Murillo 
Karam declared with apparent finality that this version of events represented “la verdad 
histórica,” or the “historical truth” about what happened in Iguala.   
 
 In responding to the crimes committed against the Ayotzinapa students and other 
innocent victims, the Mexican government recognized that the scale and intensity of the public 
outrage would not allow it to simply ignore them – as it had so many times before. Instead, the 
state, from President Peña Nieto on down, focused its energies on hampering the investigation, 
limiting responsibility to local officials and criminals, and offering a narrative that might 
convince the public to accept the deaths, and move on. Unfortunately for the authorities, few 
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were persuaded by this evident cover-up, and the people’s demands for justice and an end to 


























Chapter 5: Civil Society and International Responses 
 
 The public response to the attacks in Iguala, the Mexican authorities’ evident complicity, 
and the subsequent official cover-up, was historic in scope and intensity, marking a 
transformation in civil society’s and the wider world’s approaches to human rights in Mexico. 
Six years after the events of 2014, Ayotzinapa ranks with the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre as a 
landmark event in modern Mexican history, and the impact of the human rights response to those 
events continues to wield an outsized influence today. That response began and has been 
sustained by the unwavering determination of the victims’ families to obtain justice, and, most of 
all, to locate their missing sons. The families were joined in their cause by allies at home and 
abroad, in mounting protests, raising public awareness, applying pressure on the Mexican 
government, and exposing the official version of events as a lie – perhaps most effectively 
through the work of the IACHR’s independent expert group (GIEI).  Rather than yield to the 
power of the state and resign themselves to official impunity, as had long been the grim tradition 
in such cases, the parents of the 43 and Mexico’s civil society fought back, boldly demanding 
accountability and respect for their fundamental human rights. 
 
 In the very first hours after the attacks and disappearances of the Ayotzinapa students, 
there was considerable confusion among the family members, other students, journalists, and 
others. Most assumed, or prayed, that those taken away were being held somewhere by the 
authorities, and that they would soon be released. Perhaps they were in hiding, and would 
eventually reappear at the school or at home, as a dozen or so did the following day. Many of the 





secure their release from custody or locate them in the city themselves.100 The family members 
were joined by local teachers and other students in confronting state authorities in Iguala, 
demanding – in vain – information about the whereabouts of the missing. Fearing reprisals or 
some “new aggression,” most decided to leave the city that first day following the attacks and 
regroup to the grounds of the school in Ayotzinapa, which became their base of operations going 
forward.101 
 
 Even as the attacks in Iguala were underway and before the scale of the government’s 
crimes became clear, the Ayotzinapa students themselves launched into action to defend their 
rights. They called their fellow classmates back at the school to come and provide support.  
While en route to Iguala, those students drew on their network of contacts with local schools and 
news media to sound the alarm and organize an impromptu press event at the scene of the attacks 
on the three buses in the north of the city.102 They ignored police warnings to disperse, deciding 
instead to stand guard over the crime scene and preserve physical evidence of the shootings, 
including the shell casings that littered the street.103 Soon they were joined by local teachers and 
journalists, who were attacked together with the students when masked gunmen showed up and 
opened fire during the on-scene press briefing. 
 
 “About twenty of us from the CETEG (the local teachers union) arrived little by little to 
help the students from Ayotzinapa,” recalled Pedro Cruz Mendoza, an Iguala-based teacher. 
 
100 Gibler, I Couldn’t Even Imagine, pp. 186-190, 213-214. 
101 GIEI, Ayotzinapa I, p. 215-216. 
102 Gibler, I Couldn’t Even Imagine, p. 96. 





Cruz stated that they were present for about two hours, with no official authorities at the site, 
until the sound of automatic weapons fire caused everyone to flee for cover.104 CETEG members 
accompanied the surviving students through much of the night, offering some of them shelter in 
their members’ homes as police patrols pursued the normalistas. Local teachers, students and 
alumni mobilized to come to the aid of their Ayotzinapa colleagues, both in solidarity and 
through personal connections, and were instrumental in getting journalists on the scene quickly 
as possible.105 
  
 La Jornada's Sergio Ocampo reported that he and other journalists based in the state 
capital were called to a press conference by FUNE, a teachers college alumni activist group, 
almost immediately after the first attacks. Upon hearing about the shootings, Ocampo and a 
group of about thirty reporters, teachers, and students decided to set out for Iguala in a caravan 
just before midnight that night. Along the way, one of the newspaper reporters had gotten word 
from his office that it was not safe to go to Iguala. Undeterred, Ocampo said he replied that, 
“precisely because it is not safe to go to Iguala, we need to go and find out what’s happening.” 
106 Ocampo’s account of the attacks the following day was among the first in national news 
outlets, testament not only to his professionalism and personal courage, but also to those of so 
many of his colleagues and activists. 
 
 The story of the attacks in Iguala was sensational even by Mexico’s violent standards. 
The news of what happened the night of September 26 and subsequent reporting on the 
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disappearances were quickly taken up by national and international outlets, and within days the 
Mexican public and many around the world had become aware of the crimes and of the evident 
complicity of the authorities. In doing their jobs as professional journalists and members of civil 
society – assembling facts and testimony and publicizing these crimes – Mexican and foreign 
news media confronted the real risk of physical violence and official reprisals.  That risk was 
underscored by the attack on the street press conference in Iguala, but it accompanied the 
journalists in the weeks, months, and years afterwards, as they investigated possible perpetrators 
and gave coverage to public protests. Mexico was and remains one of the most dangerous 
countries in the world for journalists. Thirty-seven journalists were killed in Mexico in just the 
five years leading up to the Ayotzinapa case; another forty-nine would be killed in the following 
six years, with many others subjected to violent attacks and intimidation.107 
 
 The families of the missing normalistas quickly learned that their sons were not being 
held in any kind of normal custody by the police or the military. Many continued to believe that 
they had been taken away but were still being held somewhere, alive.  Indeed, that belief remains 
very strong among the families even to this day. But in the days immediately after the attacks, 
the families recognized that they were no longer confronting a situation in which the authorities 
were holding the students with the intention of releasing them soon. Rather, the focus shifted to 
demanding that the government give up their illegally-held prisoners, if they were alive, and in 
any case explain what had happened to them. The families and volunteers continued their search 
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for the missing, including in the scores of clandestine burial sites discovered by those fearing the 
worst. The also turned to the public and the international community for support, joined by allies 
in the student groups, unions, and local human rights organizations. 
 
 Among the human rights organizations that came to the aid of the Ayotzinapa families 
were the Guerrero-based “Centro de Derechos Humanos de la Montaña Tlachinollan” 
(“Tlachinollan Human Rights Center”) and the “Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín 
Pro Juárez” (a Mexico City-based human rights organization known colloquially as “Centro 
Prodh”), both of which offered legal and public relations advice, and represented the families in 
communications with the government and international organizations. Activists from 
Tlachinollan, a center dedicated to the state’s indigenous population, had been working closely 
with the Raúl Isidro Burgos school since an attack on Ayotzinapa students in 2011 that resulted 
in two deaths.108  As noted in Chapter 1, representatives from the Centro Prodh were already in 
the area on an unrelated case when they became aware of the events in Iguala and sought out the 
victims and their families. 
 
 These local human rights defenders had been engaged for decades in providing legal 
assistance to Mexican citizens seeking accountability from the government for abuses or denial 
of access to services, and offering support in raising public awareness about injustices. Some, 
like the Centro Prodh, are national in scope but active in taking on high-profile or worthy cases, 
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while others have been focused on marginalized regions or communities, as with Tlachinollan in 
the remote, mountainous area of northern Guerrero. With modest resources and staffing 
supplemented by international donors, human rights organizations in Mexico have performed 
invaluable service, often in hostile or dangerous environments.  Two years before the Iguala 
attacks, Tlachinollan lawyer Vidulfo Rosales Sierra received death threats for his work with the 
Ayotzinapa school and was forced to flee the country (he has since returned and now represents 
the families of the missing).109  
 
In his report on his country visit to Mexico in 2017, the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights defenders declared that he was “dumbfounded by the extreme violence 
[and] the climate of near-absolute impunity,” but lauded the “resilience of human rights 
defenders and their courage in seeking truth, justice and reparation.”110 A 2012 Mexican law 
establishing a protection mechanism for human rights defenders and journalists has been 
ineffective, he found, citing many hundreds of cases of violence and harassment each year that 
are not addressed by the state.  The situation of Centro Prodh and Tlachinollan was singled out in 
the UN report as “particularly worrying,” as those organizations face accusations, harassment, 
and other reprisals for their work on enforced disappearances.111 They and the family members 
of the disappeared they accompany carry out searches and other activities “at great risk to their 
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own security,” the UN emphasized.112 Those efforts had been already been underway for more 
than two years by the time of the Special Rapporteur’s visit, and continue to the present day. 
 
As the news of the missing normalistas and the authorities’ role in their enforced 
disappearance spread, the public became outraged, and diverse elements of civil society took to 
the streets and the airwaves to protest the attacks and demand the return of the missing, alongside 
their distraught and angry parents. Ayotzinapa students and teachers, colleagues from other 
teachers colleges and their unions, labor union activists, and human rights organizations 
accompanied the parents in staging outdoor protests and blockades of highways around the state 
capital within days of the attacks. On September 30, 2014, protesters marched in Chilpancingo, 
Iguala, and Acapulco, demanding the return of the missing and the firing of Governor Aguirre 
and Iguala Mayor Abarca. In Chilpancingo, students, teachers, and parents assembled in front of 
the state legislature and burned Aguirre, Abarca and President Peña Nieto in effigy. They 
chanted, “Vivos se los llevaron, vivos los queremos!” (“They took them alive, we want them 
alive”), a traditional slogan for the missing that became a longstanding feature of all future 
protests and advocacy, to the present day. Before moving on, the normalistas (but not the parents 
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As the issue of Ayotzinapa was taken up by thousands of protesters at the Tlatelolco 
anniversary October 2 in Mexico City – the very event for which the missing normalistas had 
been commandeering buses when they were attacked in Iguala – an estimated 10,000 people 
joined the families in marches and street actions in Guerrero.  Led by Ayotzinapa students and 
teachers, protesters used 30 buses to block the highway between the state capital and Acapulco 
for more than five hours.  Feeling the pressure of the growing publicity and violence, Mexican 
interior ministry officials announced that they would soon meet with parents of the missing.114 
The following day, Governor Aguirre agreed to meet with a delegation of the parents in his 
office in Chilpancingo, an encounter that was marked by desperation and outrage from the 
parents and apparent indifference from the governor. 
 
One of the most outspoken of the parents, Mario César González, recalled that he 
lambasted Aguirre for the state’s failure to locate their sons, and for lying to them.  González 
said that he told the governor that the parents only wanted to find their children, angrily charging 
that, “it’s lucky it’s not his son, because in half an hour they would have found him.”115 Aguirre 
maintained that the authorities had been searching, admitted he had no answers, and signaled his 
impatience with the parents’ demands. Afterwards, scoffing at the million-peso reward Aguirre 
had offered to find the missing students (approximately $75,000) as a “mockery,” González 
declared that “a million pesos gets him [Aguirre] drunk. That’s what one of his drinking binges 
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costs.”116  Those sentiments directed at the governor reflected not only the anger and frustration 
of the parents at the seizure of their sons, but also a profound sense of class and racial 
discrimination by the state against the poor and mostly indigenous families. Two days later, 
President Peña Nieto addressed the Ayotzinapa disappearances publicly for the first time (some 
ten days after the fact), declaring that he was “shocked” by the situation and pledged to the 
skeptical nation that there will be “no impunity.”117 
 
The protests, meanwhile, continued to grow, as up to 30,000 people filled the center of 
Mexico City October 8, joined by demonstrations in at least 25 other Mexican states and in 
world capitals such as London, Berlin, and Madrid – usually in front of Mexico’s embassies 
there.  The families of the disappeared led the march carrying photographs of their sons on their 
chests and backs, and receiving support from bystanders, who shouted, “we are with you.”  
Many of them addressed the crowd, with one father, Tanis Mendoza, declaring that “what has 
kept us strong is courage...and that is how we will continue until our children appear.” Another 
parent, Melitón Ortega, said that, “we are desperate that our children are missing, murdered, and 
seriously injured. We are in great pain.” The parents were joined by a broad coalition of teachers, 
students, union activists, human rights defenders and other activists, foremost in number the 
national teachers’ union CNTE, with many years of experience in organizing large crowds of 
protesters in the capital.118 
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Up to that point, as Anabel Hernández observes, the Mexican government had shown 
little real interest in engaging with the Ayotzinapa activists, but now “alarm bells were ringing in 
President Peña Nieto’s administration.”119 Interior Minister Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong 
received parents of the 43 missing students on October 10, 2014, accompanied by their legal 
representatives from Centro Prodh and Tlachinollan.  The parents were blunt with the interior 
minister.  “The first thing we want to say is, we don’t trust you,” they told Osorio Chong, 
according to Hernández’s reporting. They demanded the return of their sons and accused the 
Mexican military of participating in the attacks. They blamed the federal government for waiting 
until October 5 to get involved in the investigation. Osorio Chong, for his part, feigned ignorance 
of the attacks that night (although he admitted before Congress a year later that he had been kept 
apprised of events throughout), and maintained that, “we are as upset as you are, we condemn 
the actions as much as you do.” 120 It was not a convincing presentation. 
 
Three days later, Ayotzinapa students, teachers, CETEG teachers’ union activists, and 
parents laid siege to Guerrero state government offices in Chilpancingo. They clashed with riot 
police, broke down the doors of the state capitol building, and held some 3,800 employees 
hostage within for about five hours. The state’s human rights commission head managed to 
negotiate the release of the detainees, after which the protesters ransacked offices and set fire to 
the building. At roughly the same time, “dissident” teachers reportedly detonated an explosive 
device in the nearby city hall, which also caught fire. Despite police reinforcements, the 
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protesters managed to escape in their buses. Incredibly, no injuries were reported, but the fire 
damage to multiple government offices was severe.121 Such intense violence by the Ayotzinapa 
demonstrators was infrequent; their protests were largely peaceful, and aimed at both pressuring 
the government and building popular support for their cause.  Still, the Chilpancingo events were 
not an isolated incident, as ten days later demonstrators ransacked and set fire to Iguala’s city 
hall as well.122 Governor Aguirre was forced to resign by his PRD party’s national leadership 
that same day, on October 23, 2014.123 
  
 The mass marches and demonstrations in Mexico City and other cities throughout the 
country and abroad continued to grow throughout October and November 2014, reaching an 
estimated 45,000 in the national capital as part of a “Day of Global Action” on October 22, 
which also featured a nationwide student strike.124 One of the biggest rallies took place a month 
later, on November 20, in another “Day of Global Action” that brought as many as 100,000 into 
the streets of Mexico City, with marches and blockades taking place throughout the country and 
many cities around the world, in what The Guardian described as a “watershed moment.”125 The 
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protest in the capital that day was headed by the Ayotzinapa families, but included thousands of 
students, workers, academics, activists, and ordinary people fed up with impunity and corruption.  
In addition to the common slogans, such as “It was the state” and “I’ve had enough” (recalling 
Murillo Karam’s infamous remark weeks earlier), one banner read, “What can a country harvest 
if it sows bodies?”126 The missing Ayotzinapa students had become a symbol of the country’s 
political and human rights crisis, and of popular indignation about the corruption of the Mexican 
government – Peña Nieto’s above all. 
 
 In an attempt to manage the growing political threat, the Mexican president met with the 
families of the missing at the presidential palace in Mexico City on October 29.  The encounter 
did not go much better than previous such meetings between senior officials and the parents. 
First-hand accounts of the meeting with Peña Nieto noted the disparity between the elegantly 
dressed president and his team, all keeping an eye on their cell phones while the parents spoke, 
and the campesino families, some of whom borrowed clothes for the meeting and whose 
command of Spanish was weak. The president removed his tie as a gesture of informality, but 
still engaged the assembled group with what the parents saw as empty rhetoric, “more political 
theater than open dialogue.”127 “What is it that you want?” Peña Nieto asked, to which the 
families responded, “All we want are our missing sons.” “That I cannot give you. But a search is 
underway,” the president replied.128 At this, the parents began to shout that the police and the 
government were the ones who had taken them away, and they signaled, as Peña Nieto soon left 
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the room, that they would not leave the presidential palace until the government agreed to a 
signed statement concerning their demands.129 
 
 After nearly six hours with the president’s team, including Osorio Chong and Murillo 
Karam, the families departed with a ten-point agreement that committed the government to 
general and vaguely-worded actions, such as intensifying the search, ending impunity, 
recognizing grievances, and agreeing in principle to a commission to share information. The 
family members made it clear afterwards that they were very dissatisfied. One father, Nicolás 
Andrés Juan, dismissed the meeting as “more of the same,” with no new information, while 
another, Epifanio Álvarez, was quoted as saying that it seemed to them that the government was 
simply “making fun of them.”130  
 
 The final point of the agreement signed at the presidential palace was for the government 
to expedite technical assistance from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR). As María Luisa Aguilar of Centro Prodh recalled, the Mexican human rights 
defenders assisting the families recognized within days of the Iguala attacks and disappearances 
they would need to call on international organizations for support.131 Centro Prodh and the 
Tlachinollan Center, together with a third human rights group, appealed to the IACHR on 
September 30, 2014 for medidas cautelares (“provisional remedies,” an order or injunction 
issued to the state for relief and protection), which the IACHR granted on October 3. The 
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IACHR’s order recognized the gravity and urgency of the situation and directed the Mexican 
government to take all necessary measures to investigate the situation, locate and protect the 
missing students, as well as the injured students, and report on actions taken.132 Additionally, at 
the same time the human rights defenders secured approval for the Argentine Forensic 
Anthropology Team to work on the case, to ensure the identification of human remains that were 
being located in gravesites around Iguala; few had confidence in the Mexican authorities’ 
technical capabilities, nor trusted them in any case.133 
 
 After weeks of sustained public pressure from the families and human rights groups, and 
repeated suggestions that it would welcome outside help, the Mexican government finally 
formally requested technical assistance in the investigation from the IACHR on October 31, 
2014.134 Human rights defenders understood that the Mexican government “couldn’t say no,” as 
María Luisa Aguilar noted, but expected that it would follow its traditional course of agreeing to 
a course of action, and then “do everything possible to make it not happen.”135 In fact, the 
government tried its best to complete its cover-up and establish its version of events (the 
“historical truth”) before the IACHR group could establish itself and begin work on the ground, 
which took four months.  Although Mexican authorities almost certainly underestimated the 
impact that the GIEI would eventually have, perhaps expecting that the eminent international 
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experts on the team would not be as thorough and dogged as they turn out to be, they still 
dragged their heels, only reaching final agreement with the OAS on the mission November 18. 
 
 The OAS, for its part, did not move as quickly as it could have, either, finalizing its group 
on January 30, 2015. Still, the IACHR used that time to assemble a serious, independent group of 
five distinguished experts: Carlos Martín Beristain, a Spanish expert on victims and survivors of 
violence (and a medical doctor); Angela Buitrago, a Colombian prosecutor and law professor, 
with experience in forced disappearance cases; Francisco Cox Vial, a Chilean human rights 
lawyer; Claudia Paz y Paz, a former Guatemalan attorney general and expert in criminal law; and 
Alejandro Valencia Villa, a Colombian human rights lawyer with significant UN and OAS 
experience.136  The GIEI began preliminary work on the case in Washington, before making its 
first visit to Mexico March 1-19, 2015. 
 
 Although the GIEI experienced a delay of several months in beginning its work, it was 
aided by the work of Mexican human rights organizations, who work diligently in those months 
to review and help organize case files and evidence. Santiago Aguirre of Prodh and his team 
helped lay the groundwork for the GIEI’s investigation, accessing government records of the 
official investigation and flagging key issues for the international team.  Prodh and Tlachinollan 
were also instrumental in drawing on their established relationships with the Ayotzinapa 
families, assuring them that the GIEI could be trusted from the very start.137     
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 The mandate of the IACHR experts was to follow up on the medidas cautelares it had 
issued in early October, to verify and assess the actions taken by the Mexican government with 
respect to its investigation, search for the missing, forensic work, and human rights protections 
for victims, and to provide recommendations to the state. The importance of looking at all lines 
of investigation, including links between organized crime and state actors, was stated explicitly 
in the signed agreement of November 18. The Mexican government pledged to provide the GIEI 
with access to its files, resources, people, and facilities, and would guarantee its physical safety 
and immunity from prosecution.  The GIEI’s mission was set for an initial six months, subject to 
an extension of time as necessary to fulfill its objectives.138  Although described as “technical 
assistance,” it was clear that the independent experts would be coming to evaluate the Mexican 
government’s failure to investigate the case properly. As IACHR Executive Secretary Emilio 
Álvarez Icaza observed at the signing event, “this is a key moment in the contemporary history 
of Mexico, since it represents an opportunity to attack the root of this structural problem that has 
represented a tragedy for each of the thousands of victims of forced disappearances that have 
taken place in recent years, for their family, for their loved ones and for all Mexico.”139 
From the perspective of the Ayotzinapa families and Mexican civil society, the GIEI represented 
their best hope for getting at the truth and bringing accountability and justice. 
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 The faith and hope of the families were not misplaced. Throughout their mandate, the 
GIEI members poured through case files, pulled together evidence from the deliberately 
fragmented official investigations, highlighted inconsistencies, re-evaluated evidence, heard 
accounts from survivors and other witnesses never before interviewed, and produced a damning 
indictment of the Mexican government’s response. The GIEI, effectively, exposed the “historical 
truth” as a lie.  
 
In a preliminary report on May 11, 2015, the IAHRC team of independent experts 
announced that they had established that Mexican authorities were aware of the normalistas’ 
movements and actions the night of the attack and that the purported motive for moving against 
them (that they intended to disrupt an event held by the Iguala mayor’s wife) was false. They 
reported on the government’s failure to conduct a proper investigation and to protect the victims.  
The GIEI emphasized that the crimes in question were not simple kidnapping, as the government 
charged, but forced disappearance (an important distinction in law, as state actors are the 
perpetrators), torture, attempted murder, and obstruction of justice. They also confirmed 
testimony that indicated that federal and state police were on the scene and, at a minimum, 
facilitated the attacks.140 
 
With the publication of its 519-page report at the conclusion of their initial mission on 
September 6, 2015, the GIEI produced a highly detailed and comprehensive narrative of the 
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Iguala attacks and disappearances, directly challenging many critical aspects of the government’s 
official version of events. Building on their preliminary findings, the experts identified grave 
deficiencies in the government’s investigations, as reviewed in Chapter 4, including failure to 
pursue alternative lines of investigation (such as the involvement of state and federal officials, 
and the military, as well as a connection to narcotics trafficking as a possible motive for the 
attack), and determined that the government’s conclusions did not square with the facts.  The 
GIEI found levels of organization and coordination in the attacks that were inconsistent with 
other criminal cases (pointing to a leading role for the state in the crimes), established that state 
security forces were directly involved, and dismissed the official theory that the normalistas had 
been attacked at the mayor’s order and then killed after being mistaken for rival gangs.  
 
Perhaps most damning, the GIEI concluded that the waste dump at Cocula could not have 
been the scene of the crime, based on expert testimony that a fire of the magnitude needed to 
incinerate 43 bodies was, without question, physically impossible in that location and in such a 
short length of time.141 In other words, the Mexican government had botched the investigation 
and search, almost certainly to cover up its complicity, and the official version of events that it 
had come up with was demonstrably false. Francisco Goldman attended the report presentation, 
and wrote that, “it would be hard to overstate what a demolishment it was of the Mexican 
government’s official account.” “The report was historic,” he wrote, “not just because it was the 
first time that the Mexican government had acquiesced to such an intrusion by foreigners on its 
authority, but...it was also the first time Mexicans had ever seen a real criminal investigation, 
 





conducted by independent and autonomous justice professionals rather than by those subservient 
to a possibly complicit government.”142 
 
There had been some hope at the first GIEI report’s release – just short of a year after the 
attacks in Iguala – that the Mexican government might, however reluctantly, confront its 
mistakes and move forward with a credible investigation, working together with the GIEI as its 
mandate was extended for an additional six months. Murillo Karam had been fired in February of 
that year, some of the investigate units responsible for the cover-up had been sidelined, and the 
GIEI had presented a thorough, persuasive account based on the known facts, repudiating the 
government while still emphasizing its commitment to work with Mexican authorities to make 
things right.143  
 
Unfortunately, it soon became clear that the Peña Nieto government’s approach to 
working with the GIEI had instead hardened.  The authorities continued to deny the independent 
experts access to the Mexican military, even as evidence mounted that the 27th Battalion, 
stationed in the heart of Iguala, played a significant, if not leading, role in the attacks. Through 
its contacts and surrogates in the national news media, the government sought to discredit GIEI 
members publicly, accusing them of malfeasance and of being engaged in human rights 
violations and corruption in their own countries.  Mexican law enforcement officials then 
suggested that they would investigate such charges, despite their evident fabrication and the 
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immunity the GIEI enjoyed under the terms of its agreement.144 In April 2016, three UN special 
rapporteurs joined in denouncing the “defamation campaigns” against GIEI and other human 
rights defenders and called on Mexico to end the harassment.145  GIEI members concluded their 
second six-month mandate by observing that the Mexican government had effectively ended its 
cooperation with them.  “The conditions to conduct our work don’t exist,” Claudia Paz y Paz was 
quoted as saying. “The proof is that the government opposed the extension of our mandate.”146 
Later, the GIEI revealed that the Mexican government had used sophisticated spyware to monitor 
their investigations and the activities of other human rights defenders, presumably without a 
legal court order.147 
 
At the April 24, 2016 presentation of their second major report documenting the Mexican 
government’s human rights violations, the GIEI members summarized their findings to the 
assembled crowd in Mexico City – which did not include invited government representatives, 
who declined to attend.  They highlighted video evidence that authorities (no less than chief 
investigator Tomás Zerón) had planted human remains at the river site where they were 
supposedly “discovered” the next day, demonstrating not only a false narrative but the planting 
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of physical evidence that the government had in its possession. The GIEI members expressed 
deep regret that they had not been allowed by the government to extend their mandate further. 
Holding placards with photos of their missing sons, family members in attendance shouted at the 
GIEI not to leave. A few days later, the families and the Ayotzinapa community held an 
emotional farewell for the GIEI team on the school’s grounds, where the members were covered 
in flower garlands and again tearfully urged not to go. “Because of you, the farce that the 
government created has collapsed,” declared Ciriaco Vázquez, one of the fathers. “You are 
leaving now, but be assured that we will continue in the fight until the truth is exposed and our 
colleagues return to us,” said one of the surviving normalistas.148 The work of the GIEI was also 
hailed in a joint statement by five UN special rapporteurs, who declared that the final report 
“shows serious deficiencies in the justice system and a worrying weakness of the state to 
investigate with due diligence human rights violations and the sophisticated level of coordination 
of some authorities in the commission of crimes.” The UN officials regretted the Mexican 
government’s lack of support, but maintained that the GIEI had “fully vindicated the rights of 
victims” in the case.149 The IACHR announced a special follow-up mechanism, which would try 
to sustain the GIEI’s progress, however from a distance. 
 
 Although the street protests peaked in size and intensity in November and December 
2014, the families of the missing and their allies sustained demonstrations and public outreach, 
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into the following year and through to the present day.  As María Luisa Aguilar of Centro Prodh 
noted, the families have been the driving force throughout, showing great resilience and giving 
the movement focus. Despite most not knowing each other at first and coming from often very 
different backgrounds, and with varying abilities to dedicate their time and effort, the Ayotzinapa 
families have drawn strength from being together, she observed.  Over the years, the numbers of 
those families actively engaged in protests and advocacy have gone up and down, but Aguilar 
reported that for larger events and meetings, even in 2020, they still manage to have about thirty 
families participating – often people of modest means who have to travel far from isolated 
communities to make their voices heard in the capital.150 
 
 Just as the GIEI was beginning its work in March 2015, a number of family members and 
human rights defenders organized an extraordinary tour through the United States to raise 
awareness of their cause and strengthen relationships with social justice and Mexican-American 
groups to the north. Roughly sixteen parents and students devoted six weeks to traveling along 
three different routes within the U.S., coordinating with local partners in cities along the west 
coast, central U.S. and the east coast, and joining together in Washington and New York at the 
end.  “Caravan 43” allowed family members to build support for their cause with a wide range of 
sympathetic audiences in each location, garnering local press coverage and expressions of 
solidarity.151152 Although a modest effort in terms of scale, the caravan was successful in 
reaching important groups.  The family members met with members of the Congressional 
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Hispanic Caucus, lobbied congressional and administration officials, secured a city council 
resolution of support in Austin, participated in the 14th session of the UN’s Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, and met with UN officials in New York.153 Among the messages the families 
delivered on their U.S. tour was an appeal to cut anti-narcotics funding to the Mexican military 
and police, through the U.S. government’s Merida Initiative program.  Citing human rights 
concerns, and with Ayotzinapa mentioned as a major contributing factor, the U.S. government 
did cut funding – however slightly, by $5 million – in October 2015.154 Despite voicing concerns 
about Ayotzinapa and other human rights cases, however, the U.S. demonstrated reluctance to 
take stronger measures when weighing those concerns against urgent (however ill-considered) 
priorities in trying to stem the flow of illegal drugs and related crime from Mexico. 
 
 Despite the Peña Nieto government’s best efforts to escape accountability for Ayotzinapa 
and encourage the country to move on, Mexican civil society and the international community 
ensured that the case would not be abandoned. Although the missing had not been located and 
the perpetrators of the crime had not yet been brought to justice, the state’s crimes and its cover-
up had been exposed. After years of appeals and legal motions from human rights defenders, a 
Mexican federal court on May 31, 2018 issued a sweeping order condemning the government’s 
investigation of the case and ordering a new one, this time under the supervision of a truth 
commission to include family members of the victims. Even those involved in pursuing the 
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appeals appeared surprised by the scale of their legal victory.  “I can’t think of a precedent for 
this,” a lawyer for Centro Prodh was quoted as saying.155 The Ayotzinapa team issued a 
statement declaring that the decision “confirms that the truth of the Ayotzinapa case has not been 
told, the whereabouts of the victims are unknown, and that the current federal administration 
committed multiple irregularities in the investigation. These conclusions, already made by 
international bodies, have now been established by a national tribunal.”156 
 
 With the court decision to re-open the case, Peña Nieto on his way out, and the likely 
next president – Andres Manuel López Obrador, who would win election at the end of the year – 
already committed to fulfilling the new mandate to investigate the crimes thoroughly, the 
Ayotzinapa families and their allies had reason to feel that they had prevailed, at least in 
mounting a resistance. Although the likelihood diminished each year that even the remains of 
their missing sons would be found, the families had ensured that they were not forgotten, and – 
with the help of the country’s civil society and the international community – an important blow 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Reflections on the Human Rights Defense 
 
 As with any recent and ongoing events, assessing the historical impact of the responses to 
the Ayotzinapa attacks and forced disappearances must be done with the recognition that the full 
outcome is not yet known.  Many human rights activists and commentators agree that 
Ayotzinapa has been a “watershed” event, perhaps a turning point in Mexico’s modern history of 
civil society engagement. After enduring decades of extreme violence, murders, and forced 
disappearances, ordinary Mexican citizens stood up against their governments, took to the streets 
in huge numbers, engaged domestic allies and international support, and refused to be silenced.  
They did so standing on the shoulders of earlier protest and civic movements, drawing support 
from student, teacher, labor, and leftist groups, but on a scale not seen in generations, capturing 
the attention of the country and the world, and threatening the political survival of a cynical, 
corrupt regime. 
 
 Still, few, if any, of the families of the missing students would consider that justice has 
been done, as their sons have not been found, their questions about what happened to them have 
not been answered, and those responsible for their disappearance and murder have not been 
identified and held accountable. For the Ayotzinapa families, having made history through their 
actions may matter little if they never learn what happened to their children and if their 
murderers go unpunished. Moreover, the popular revolt against the state and impunity has not 
even slowed the pace of kidnappings and murders in Mexico. There has not been another such 





missing in 2019, the first full year of the López Obrador government – Mexico’s second-highest 
number ever.157 
 
 While no one can reasonably argue that the victims of Ayotzinapa have gotten justice or 
that anything close to an end to impunity has been achieved in Mexico, neither can it be denied 
that Mexican civil society has succeeded in demonstrating that it can fight back against the state 
and expose its criminality. The normalistas of Ayotzinapa have not been found alive, their 
remains have not been located, the real motives and perpetrators of the crimes are not fully 
known, and no one has yet been tried and sentenced for the forced disappearances, tortures, and 
murders.  And yet, what the families and other human rights defenders, with critical help from 
abroad, have managed to achieve in forcing a public reckoning and retreat by the Peña Nieto 
government is extraordinary. The response to the Iguala attacks and disappearances was 
markedly different from the responses to the thousands of other such crimes in the decades 
before; the people fought back, the world paid attention, and the government was thoroughly 
discredited, both at home and internationally. This time, the state could not ignore or cover up its 
crimes. 
 
 There were many aspects of the Ayotzinapa case that made the difference, that helped to 
transform a local tragedy into a landmark human rights event.  First, as Maureen Meyer of the 
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and many others have observed, the Iguala 
 
157 Sheridan, Mary Beth. “Disappearances in Mexico rose during López Obrador’s first year, 







attacks stood out because there were so many victims killed and taken at once, and that they were 
all young students, mostly first-year normalistas between the ages of 18 and 20.158 The 
government later tried to portray them as hoodlums or as a group that had been infiltrated by 
criminal gangs, but to the public – which saw the parents marching for their sons, and the posters 
of the students’ collected photos, images of mere boys – they were simply victims, with no one 
but their abductors and murderers to blame.   
 
In contrast to other forced disappearances, this time there was a large cadre of parents 
that joined together in grief and outrage, supported by the Ayotzinapa school, which provided 
them with a temporary home and base of operations. There, they got to know each other, and 
reinforced their common resolve to fight back.  The families drew strength from each other, even 
as they responded in different ways. At first, most were engaged in the searches, and many of the 
parents made that their principal focus for months and even years. A large group of family 
members turned quickly to mobilization, however, working with the activist normalistas and 
school faculty to organize the mass protests, marches, and media events.159 Some of the parents 
of course returned to their homes and their previous lives, but for the first time in memory a 
large, well-organized group of victims’ family members would reliably turn out, week after 
week, demanding that the state return their children to them.  The families were the engines of 
the civil society response.  If it hadn’t been for them, as Meyer observed, there could never have 
been the level of sustained visibility that the Ayotzinapa case garnered.160 
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The school itself also made an enormous difference, providing the parents with both a 
support structure and the benefit of many years of experience in organizing demonstrations and 
other protest actions. The idealistic, leftist fervor of the students and faculty of the Raúl Isidro 
Burgos Rural Teachers College must have had an impact on the families while staying on 
campus, with every wall covered in revolutionary slogans. If not the school’s politics, exactly, at 
least the energy and the students’ readiness to enter into confrontation with the authorities 
galvanized many of the parents. Certainly, they acted in the early months after the attacks in 
close coordination with the school and its allies in the other teachers colleges and the labor 
unions. 
 
Another factor that worked in civil society’s favor was that the large number of people 
involved in the Iguala attacks meant that there were many survivors and eyewitnesses to give 
first-hand testimony.  Not only were the students and others on the scene able and willing to 
provide their accounts to the news media, but they also had numerous cell phone recordings to 
share (although the video quality in most cases was poor, because of their basic devices).  The 
fact that the movement could rely on so many student-survivors to appear before the media, 
alongside the families and activists, was a great advantage in sustaining the public’s attention.161 
The prevalence of social media amplified those voices further, allowing civil society to mobilize 
and disseminate their messages far more broadly and effectively than was possible just a few 
years before. Social media helped the Ayotzinapa families and advocates level the playing field, 
where the government had previously been able to dominate coverage of human rights situations. 
 
 





Human rights defenders such as the Tlachinollan Center and Centro Prodh had been 
active in grass-roots advocacy on behalf of victims for many years before the Ayotzinapa 
disappearances, which prepared them to take on what would become their most high-profile and 
significant case. Their contributions were critical to the success of the campaign to prevent the 
Mexican government from covering up its crimes with a fraudulent investigation. As the 
journalist Marina Franco noted, it was those groups that represented the families in confronting 
the state, reached out to the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Group, secured the intervention of 
the IACHR and helped establish the GIEI, and undertook the research and preparation to litigate 
the case in Mexican courts – which eventually led to the May 2018 federal court decision 
ordering a re-do of the investigation. They have been tireless advocates, and even opened their 
premises to provide accommodations for family members who journey to Mexico City from 
Guerrero.162 These Mexican human rights defenders were as indispensable to the civil society 
response as were the families and survivors themselves. Their close, coordinated action and 
years-long dedication demonstrated how effectively the people can challenge the state, at least in 
such landmark cases. 
 
Clearly, an enormous debt is owed to the GIEI team, which served as a counter-weight to 
the Mexican government. As representatives of the international community, established experts 
in their own right, and having been invited by the Mexican government (however reluctantly), 
the GIEI not only shredded the official “historical truth,” but did so with authority and 
credibility. Fortunately for the GIEI investigation, the local, state and federal authorities failed to 
coordinate a plausible cover story, and preserved enough documentary evidence in their own 
 





files (perhaps never expecting that anyone would put all the pieces together) to allow the GIEI to 
build a persuasive case against the government and its theory of the crime.  Similarly, the 
Argentine forensic team was able to establish with a high degree of confidence that the Mexican 
authorities planted evidence (refuting the government’s claim that it had been present when bone 
fragments were “discovered”) and also were able to perform the DNA analysis through the 
University of Innsbruck that confirmed the identities of the two victims whose partial remains 
have been found since 2014. Mexican law enforcement lacks the technical and professional 
capabilities to do their jobs correctly, and very few people trust them in any case.  Unlike in 
previous cases of forced disappearance and other grave human rights violations, there was for 
Ayotzinapa a real alternative to the state’s version of events. The public was able to trust the 
GIEI’s reports and the work of the EAAF team. 
 
Finally, one aspect of the Ayotzinapa case that helped sustained public attention was the 
mystery of it. The country and the world were justifiably shocked by the attacks and the 
disappearance of so many young men at once, but interest in the story has been maintained 
because of the unanswered questions surrounding the events and the motives, as well as the 
possibility (however remote) that the victims or their remains will yet be found.  Had the bodies 
of the 43 been discovered soon afterward, it is unlikely that the case would have continued to 
generate as much attention and speculation by the public and the news media. 
 
Among the enduring impacts of Ayotzinapa has been to change public perceptions in 
Mexico about forced disappearances, in addition to giving higher profile to these crimes, which 





observed that forced disappearances and kidnappings have not been widely understood in the 
country, as many had assumed before Ayotzinapa that most victims were targeted because of 
their involvement in criminal activity, with as part of a drug trafficking organization or otherwise 
with some connection to it.  In other words, that the victims were somehow themselves to blame 
for what had happened to them.163 Since Ayotzinapa, many more families have gone public with 
their accounts of forced disappearances of family members, calling themselves Los otros 
desaparecidos, or the Other Disappeared. These people “had either been too afraid to speak out 
publicly or had slipped into desperation upon authorities’ refusal to look for their loved ones,” 
John Gibler writes. “In the first seven months of looking [on their own] they found more than 
100 bodies in places where the state and federal investigators had supposedly searched and found 
none.”164 The intense focus on the Ayotzinapa case to the detriment of others has caused some 
tensions among the Other Disappeared, but, overall, the greater awareness of the issue and 
understanding about the nature of the victims have been positive and well received.165 
 
 In the past two years since the López Obrador government came to power on promises to 
end corruption and impunity, the record on Ayotzinapa has been mixed, marked by positive 
developments, but also frustration with the pace of progress. The new president named a Truth 
and Justice Commission as mandated by the May 2018 federal court decision, appointing 
victims’ parents and human rights defenders as members. The López Obrador administration 
also increased funding for two bodies that had been established under the 2017 law on 
disappearances before the change of governments, but not made fully operational until 2019: the 
 
163 Aguilar, personal interview. 
164 Gibler, I Couldn’t Even Imagine, pp. 231-233. 





National Search Commission (CNB), coordinating search efforts in the field, and the National 
Search System (SNB), meant to coordinate state institution efforts.166 After considerable delay, 
the government approved in August 2020 a Standardized Protocol for Searching for Disappeared 
and Missing Persons, which is aimed at improving rapid and thorough responses to cases.167 In 
December 2019, at the urging of victims’ families and human rights groups, the Mexican 
government created an Extraordinary Mechanism of Forensic Identification, a temporary body to 
clear the backlog of unidentified remains. 
 
 On investigations, the new administration established in June 2019 a special unit within 
the attorney general’s office to prosecute the Ayotzinapa case, headed by Omar Gómez Trejo, a 
respected human rights lawyer with UN experience who had served as the executive secretary to 
the GIEI.168 Although the government was forced to release those charged under the previous 
administration because their testimony had been obtained through torture, the new special 
prosecutor was able to bring charges in March 2020 against five senior Mexican officials for 
forced disappearance, torture and obstruction of justice, and against an additional 46 municipal 
officials from Guerrero on related charges. The investigation is proceeding much more slowly 
than many families want, but there is a sense of some momentum and that the government is 
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serious about bringing officials and criminals to justice in the case.169 In July 2020, Gómez Trejo 
announced that DNA analysis by the University of Innsbruck had confirmed remains of one of 
the missing normalistas, Christian Alfonso Rodríguez Telumbre – only the second of the 43 to 
be so identified. Acting on an anonymous tip, investigators found a bone fragment about half a 
mile from the Cocula dump site, and they reported that they expected to find more remains in the 
area.170 
 
 Despite such progress and the apparently serious intentions of senior Mexican officials, 
including López Obrador, who meets regularly with the Truth and Justice Commission, there is 
ample cause to be skeptical that the government will be able to locate the missing and 
successfully prosecute these crimes after so many years – especially when the plague of 
disappearances meanwhile continues unabated.  Certainly for the families, much hope has died, 
despite the protestations of some that their sons will be found one day.  But even the harshest 
critics of the López Obrador administration – for the slow pace in the cases, for the government’s 
continued deference to the military despite pledging to end impunity (investigators are still not 
allowed full access to the army base in Iguala, for example), and for not ending the violence – 
must concede that Peña Nieto’s criminal approach to this case has been reversed. 
 
 The fight for justice for the missing 43 and thousands of others like them is far from over.  
Mexico remains as violent a place as it was six years ago.  And, yet, the experience of 
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Ayotzinapa has demonstrated to the Mexican people the power they hold, even against a corrupt 
and repressive regime determined to hide their crimes. The families and colleagues of those 
normalistas, working closely with allies among human rights defenders, labor activists, the 
media, and other members of civil society, and with the assistance of international human rights 
mechanisms, refused to submit to the state and exposed its crimes to the world.  Whatever 
happens in the year ahead, whether the investigations and prosecutions progress or not, 
Ayotzinapa will stand as a critical point in history, an episode that will serve as a landmark event 
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